Autonomous system
AS16285 ASN-UMN Technicheskaya Str.18b, Yekaterinburg, Russia
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
TransTeleCom
telecom isp transit
One address answers reverse DNS with the reverse-lookup name itself, pointing at nothing but the question.
What it's used for
- A carrier's regional network. Fifty-five prefixes announced from the Russian Federation, twenty-seven of them IPv6, forty-four thousand and thirty-two addresses, through three observed BGP neighbours.
Notable
- The AS handle is three initials and then a street name, a house number with a letter suffix, a city and a country. The routing label is a postal address, and the initials match nothing in the holder field.
- Every sampled block uses one scheme: a country code, the carrier's brand, and a full date, with dates spanning eleven years.
- All of them list the same two contacts, an operations centre abbreviated to three letters and the company under its full legal form.
- Two of eighteen queried addresses answered. One returns the special-purpose name that reverse lookups are asked under, with the address written backwards, so the answer is a restatement of the query.
- The other pairs a two-letter protocol abbreviation and the last octet with a town's name as the domain.
- Twenty-seven IPv6 prefixes against twenty-eight IPv4 blocks is close to parity between the protocols.
Interesting
- A reverse record answering with the reverse-lookup name is what a misconfigured zone produces: the server has been told to point the name at itself. It resolves, it means nothing, and nothing checks it.
- Initials in a handle that match no company are the previous operator. Regional carriers get absorbed and the label stays, because changing it needs a reason and keeping it needs none.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 28 prefixes · 44.03K addresses IPv6 27 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| RU | Russian Federation | 55 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS16285- Registry name
- ASN-UMN
- Registrant
- Joint Stock Company TransTeleCom
- Abuse contact
- abuse@ttk.ru
- Registered
- 2002-07-29
- Last changed
- 2025-01-13
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 62 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS16285
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 62 of 62 announcements
- Route objects
- 82 naming AS16285
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere