asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS16220 UTCBNET

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 3.84K 4 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly RO
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

UTCBNet Civil Engineering University of Bucharest

Romania · AI-generated

education research isp

Reverse names written by hand, labelling broadcast addresses, campuses and the border router by name.

What it's used for

  • A university's campus network. Four IPv4 prefixes announced from Romania, no IPv6, three thousand eight hundred and forty addresses, through one observed BGP neighbour.

Notable

  • None of the four blocks is registered to the university. Two belong to the national informatics research institute, one to the national education network agency, and one lists only an abuse role.
  • Three netnames carry a date. Two write it as eight digits, the oldest as six, dropping the century.
  • Ten of twelve queried addresses answered, and every name was typed by somebody rather than generated.
  • Four begin with an abbreviation for broadcast, so the last address of a range is labelled as such instead of being left to the reader to work out.
  • Others name a campus, a city district, the administration network, a departmental address pool, and the border router, which is called exactly that.

Interesting

  • Hand-written reverse names scale badly and survive anyway, because the person maintaining them knows what every range is for. A campus is small enough that this is still true after decades.
  • Marking broadcast addresses in DNS is a courtesy to whoever is reading a packet capture at three in the morning. It costs one record per range and answers a question before it is asked.
  • The university runs the network but holds none of the addresses. The research institute is the member of the registry, and the campus is a customer of it.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS2614Agentia de Administrare a Retelei Nationale de Informatica pentru Educatie si Cercetare310

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 4 prefixes · 3.84K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
RORomania4

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS16220
Registry name
UTCBNet
Registrant
ALSYS-MNT
Abuse contact
it@utcb.ro
Registered
1970-01-01
Last changed
2017-11-15
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
20% valid · 1 valid, 4 with no ROA
ROAs
1 authorising AS16220
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 5 of 5 announcements
Route objects
5 naming AS16220

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 436 networks and 1,771 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check