Autonomous system
AS16186 ASN-SSC
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
IP Group
hosting isp business
The reverse names are short strings of letters and digits that share a prefix within each block and say nothing about the address.
What it's used for
- A hosting and access provider. Ten IPv4 prefixes and five IPv6 prefixes announced from Norway, fifteen thousand eight hundred and seventy-two addresses, across seventeen observed BGP neighbours.
Notable
- Nine of eighteen queried addresses answered. Eight give a compact string of five to seven characters mixing letters and digits, then two letters for an address and the company domain.
- Within each block those strings share their first four or five characters and differ at the end, so the scheme encodes the block and then the address, in a form no reader can decode by eye.
- The ninth answer breaks the pattern completely: two letters for a gateway on an unrelated national domain.
- Nine netnames share a country code, a third brand that appears nowhere else in the record, and a date, with dates running from the first weeks of two thousand and one to two thousand and twenty.
- A tenth block is named for a hosting product and lists only an abuse role.
- The AS handle is three letters matching the reverse domain rather than the holder's name.
Interesting
- Encoded hostnames are compact and stable, and they leak nothing. Whether that is a feature or an accident of the generator, the effect is the same: the name identifies the address without describing it.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 2 exchanges in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| Norwegian Internet Exchange Oslo 1 | Oslo, Norway | 185.1.55.37 |
| Free Internet eXchange Oslo | Oslo, Norway | 91.198.176.10 |
Transit providers
10 upstream, 2 downstream and 19 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-15, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 9 prefixes · 15.62K addresses IPv6 5 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| NO | Norway | 14 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS16186- Registry name
- ASN-SSC
- Registrant
- IP Group AS
- Abuse contact
- rsgfetr32twsgfsegdrehbg@ssc.net
- Registered
- 2002-09-22
- Last changed
- 2017-11-15
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 15 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 15 authorising AS16186
- ASPA
- 3 declared providers
- IRR
- 100% registered · 15 of 15 announcements
- Route objects
- 15 naming AS16186
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,782 prefixes, as published 2026-10-16. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere