asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS16177 EQUENSWORLDLINE Via Zurigo, 3

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 5.63K 14 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly NL
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 2 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

equensWorldline

Netherlands · AI-generated

finance infrastructure enterprise

Three generations of company name across fourteen blocks, and a street address from another country in the handle.

What it's used for

  • A payment processor's network. Fourteen IPv4 prefixes announced from the Netherlands, no IPv6, five thousand six hundred and thirty-two addresses, through two observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • Most blocks share one netname of country code, the middle-generation brand and a single date, so a large part of the holding was registered on one day.
  • Two use the current merged brand with a legal form suffix, and three use the original brand followed by the letters for a local network and a two or three letter code, which names an internal segment rather than a company.
  • Those three are registered to a technical contacts role carrying the middle-generation name, while everything else lists the current one, so the record holds all three eras at once.
  • The AS handle is the current brand followed by a street name and a house number from a city in another country, which is where the parent group sits rather than where the blocks are announced.
  • Eighteen addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name.

Interesting

  • Payment processors carve their address space into named internal segments because the regulators want to know which systems touch card data. A netname describing a local network is an audit boundary that escaped into a public database.
  • Two upstreams for a processor that clears a country's payments looks thin until you remember that its real connections are private lines to banks, invisible to routing.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

2 upstream, 0 downstream and 2 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS41233Worldline SA960
AS47957Worldline IGSA SA360

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-27, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 14 prefixes · 5.63K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
NLNetherlands14

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS16177
Registry name
EquensWorldline
Registrant
AS16177-MNT
Abuse contact
abuse@worldline.com
Registered
2001-10-31
Last changed
2023-01-27
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 22 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
3 authorising AS16177
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 22 of 22 announcements
Route objects
43 naming AS16177

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 447 networks and 1,852 prefixes, as published 2026-10-27. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check