Autonomous system
AS16135 TURKCELL-AS TURKCELL ILETISIM HIZMETLERI A.S.
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
Turkcell
mobile telecom isp
One point seven million addresses, thirty IPv6 blocks, and most of them registered to an abuse desk rather than to the company.
What it's used for
- A mobile operator. One hundred and eleven IPv4 prefixes and thirty IPv6 prefixes announced from Turkey, more than one million six hundred thousand addresses, through one observed BGP neighbour.
Notable
- Most netnames are a country code, the brand and the word for the internet, with no date, and the only registrant listed on them is the operator's abuse handling role. The company itself appears on just two blocks, which use a dated netname template instead.
- The IPv6 allocations are cut at unusual boundaries, several of them at sizes that sit between the round numbers most operators use, which is the mark of a very large space subdivided by region or service.
- The IPv4 blocks run from large aggregates down to small ones across more than a hundred entries, mostly in a handful of contiguous ranges.
- Eighteen addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name.
Interesting
- Mobile networks hold enormous address space for a subscriber base that is almost never reachable from outside. Handsets get addresses to make connections, not to receive them, and a single such operator can hold more numbers than a small country's fixed-line providers combined.
- Naming an abuse role as the registrant of record on most blocks is a practical choice for an operator whose ranges generate complaints continuously: whoever writes in reaches the desk that can act.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 0 downstream and 2 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS34984 | Superonline Iletisim Hizmetleri A.S. | 22,453 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-03, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 111 prefixes · 1.69M addresses IPv6 29 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| TR | Turkey | 140 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS16135- Registry name
- TURKCELL-AS
- Registrant
- TURKCELL ILETISIM HIZMETLERI A.S.
- Abuse contact
- solip@superonline.net
- Registered
- 2004-04-21
- Last changed
- 2019-12-04
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- TURKCELL
- Also known as
- TURKCELL ILETISIM HIZMETLERI A.S.
- Scope
- Not Disclosed
- Traffic ratio
- Not Disclosed
- Peering policy
- Selective
- IRR as-set
RIPE::AS16135- Website
- http://www.turkcell.com.tr
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 415 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 342 authorising AS16135
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 99.8% registered · 414 of 415 announcements 1 other origin
- Route objects
- 720 naming AS16135
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 448 networks and 1,851 prefixes, as published 2026-11-04. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere