Autonomous system
AS16006 ASN for Rupkki
Unclassified ARIN
Summary
RUPKKI
isp telecom business
Eighteen of eighteen addresses answer, and one of them answers with the wrong address.
What it's used for
- A regional provider. Eight IPv4 prefixes and one IPv6
/32announced from Slovakia, eleven thousand two hundred and sixty-four addresses, across two observed BGP neighbours.
Notable
- Every queried address returned a name, all but one built from the word for a host and the four octets hyphenated. One of them carries a different third number from the address it answers for, so the name and the address disagree.
- The exception is an administrative station named in words rather than numbers, with a letter dropped from the first one.
- Four blocks share a netname whose country code appears twice in a row before the brand and a date.
- One netname is the brand, a contraction for customers, and a word for residential with a letter missing.
- Three blocks list only an abuse role as registrant, with no company named on them at all.
- Eleven thousand addresses on eight announcements behind two upstreams.
Interesting
- A generated reverse zone that contains one wrong address is more revealing than a missing one. The rule produced the name from a template and somebody edited a copy by hand, leaving a name that resolves to a block it does not belong to.
- Two misspellings in two different netnames, from the same holder, suggest the fields were typed rather than generated, and that nothing has read them back since.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 3 prefixes · 11.26K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| SK | Slovakia | 4 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- ARIN
- Handle
AS16006- Registry name
- RUPKKI-SK-AS
- Registrant
- MNT-RUP
- Abuse contact
- abuse@rupkki.sk
- Registered
- 2009-02-06
- Last changed
- 2025-01-30
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 12 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 4 authorising AS16006
- ASPA
- 3 declared providers
- IRR
- 100% registered · 12 of 12 announcements
- Route objects
- 20 naming AS16006
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 436 networks and 1,771 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere