asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS15974 VTT-AS ISP, Saratov, Russia.

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 45.31K 26 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 18 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly RU
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 4 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

TransTeleCom (Saratov)

Russian Federation · AI-generated

isp telecom transit

Each reverse name ends with a three-letter code for the city the line terminates in.

What it's used for

  • A regional arm of a national carrier. Twenty-six IPv4 prefixes and eighteen IPv6 prefixes announced from the Russian Federation, forty-five thousand three hundred and twelve addresses, across five observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • Ten of eighteen queried addresses answered. Every name is the access protocol, then the four octets hyphenated, then a label marking the address as changeable, then three letters for a city, then a retail subdomain.
  • Three different city codes appear among ten answers, so one block spans several towns.
  • Nearly all netnames are a country code, the parent carrier's full brand, and a date, with the oldest from the very start of the century.
  • One block breaks the pattern with the local brand, the access protocol and a city name spelled out, and lists three contacts where the others list two.
  • The AS handle appends the letters for a provider, a city and a country, and ends with a full stop.
  • The eighteen IPv6 prefixes are nested pieces of one range, from a /36 down to a /48.

Interesting

  • Writing the access technology into the name tells any receiving network that the address belongs to a consumer line, which is exactly what mail and abuse systems want to know before deciding how to treat traffic from it.
  • A local brand surviving on one block while the parent's name covers the rest is what a regional operator looks like a few years after being absorbed.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 4 downstream and 7 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS20485Joint Stock Company TransTeleCom1,579

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 26 prefixes · 45.31K addresses IPv6 18 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
RURussian Federation44

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS15974
Registry name
VTT-AS
Registrant
Joint Stock Company TransTeleCom
Abuse contact
abuse@ttk.ru
Registered
2002-08-16
Last changed
2025-01-14
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 28 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
9 authorising AS15974
ASPA
2 declared providers
IRR
100% registered · 28 of 28 announcements
Route objects
31 naming AS15974

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check