Autonomous system
AS15962 OSK-DNI Slovakia
Unclassified RIPE NSP
Summary
Orange Slovensko
telecom mobile isp
One of the twenty-one blocks is registered in another country, to the parent group's registry membership.
What it's used for
- A national mobile and fixed operator. Twenty-one IPv4 prefixes and one IPv6
/28announced from Slovakia, two hundred and sixty-one thousand one hundred and twenty addresses, across forty-two observed BGP neighbours.
Notable
- Most netnames are a country code, the brand and an eight-digit date, with three blocks sharing the date
20000511. - One is a country code for a different country entirely, the word for telecommunications, and a date, registered to the group's registry membership rather than to the local company.
- Another drops the day and carries only a year and month, six digits where every other block has eight.
- Seventeen of eighteen queried addresses answered. All but one are the four octets hyphenated, then a label marking the address as changeable or fixed, then the brand's domain.
- The exception is a two-letter host on a customer's own domain, sitting in the middle of a consumer range.
- The IPv6 allocation is a
/28, larger than the provider-sized ranges elsewhere in this stretch.
Interesting
- Marking addresses as changeable or fixed in the name itself is a service tier made visible. Mail servers and abuse systems read those labels, so the naming is not documentation, it is policy that other networks act on.
- A parent group's block appearing in a subsidiary's announcement is how multinational carriers move address space without transferring registrations.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 2 exchanges in 2 countries, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| Peering.cz | Prague, Czech Republic | 185.0.20.186 |
| Slovak Internet eXchange Bratislava | Bratislava, Slovakia | 192.108.148.25 |
Transit providers
9 upstream, 9 downstream and 28 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 15 prefixes · 261K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| SK | Slovakia | 16 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS15962- Registry name
- OSK-DNI
- Registrant
- ITSHOS-MNT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@orange.sk
- Registered
- 1970-01-01
- Last changed
- 2026-06-02
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- Orange Slovensko
- Network type
- NSP
- Scope
- Regional
- Traffic ratio
- Mostly Inbound
- Peering policy
- Selective
- IRR as-set
AS-OSK-DNI- Present at
- 3 exchanges
- Facilities
- 2 facilities
- Website
- http://www.orange.sk
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 17 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 22 authorising AS15962
- ASPA
- 2 declared providers
- IRR
- 100% registered · 17 of 17 announcements
- Route objects
- 23 naming AS15962
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere