asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS15953 AS_KBCGS_CEDC

Unclassified RIPE NCC

IPv4 addresses 6.14K 2 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 1 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly BE
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

KBC Global Services

Belgium · AI-generated

finance enterprise business

The first registrant is a registry handle rather than a name, and the netname date falls in the early nineteen-nineties.

What it's used for

  • A banking group's shared services network. Two IPv4 prefixes and one IPv6 /47 announced from Belgium, six thousand one hundred and forty-four addresses, through a single observed BGP neighbour.

Notable

  • Both blocks share a netname of a country code, the group's name, and the date 19921020, which is among the earliest in this range.
  • The first entry in the registrant list is a registry object identifier, four letters, a digit and the registry's own suffix, rather than a person or a company.
  • The AS handle is built with underscores instead of hyphens, joining the letters for an autonomous system, a contraction of the group with its services arm, and a four-letter code for something the record never expands.
  • The IPv6 prefix is a /47, an odd size that is two adjacent site-sized ranges treated as one announcement.
  • The routing archive first saw this number three years after the numbers around it.
  • Six addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name.

Interesting

  • A registry handle in a name field is what happens when a record is edited through the raw interface rather than a form: the handle is what the database actually stores, and the human-readable name is the thing that has to be looked up.
  • Address space dating from the early nineteen-nineties on a banking group means the network predates the group's own internet presence by years.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 0 downstream and 2 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS32787Akamai Technologies, Inc.219

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-10, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 2 prefixes · 6.14K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
BEBelgium3

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE NCC · via Atlas (registry data)
Registry
RIPE NCC
Registered
2000-11-10
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 4 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS15953
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 4 of 4 announcements
Route objects
13 naming AS15953

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,775 prefixes, as published 2026-10-11. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check