Autonomous system
AS15937 ADIF
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
ADIF
infrastructure government enterprise
The rail infrastructure manager announces the train operator's address blocks alongside its own.
What it's used for
- A railway infrastructure body's network. Four IPv4 prefixes announced from Spain, no IPv6, eight thousand one hundred and ninety-two addresses, across two observed BGP neighbours.
Notable
- Three of the four blocks are registered to the national train operating company, under its own netname, while the announcement comes from the infrastructure manager's number.
- The fourth is the holder's own, and its registrant list runs to three entries: an administrative contact, a contact role, and an abuse role, all built from the same four letters.
- The holder's name appears twice in a row in the routing record, once as the handle and once as the company, with nothing else to distinguish them.
- The four prefixes are all pieces of one range, with a
/20announced whole and three smaller pieces announced separately inside the space next to it. - Twelve addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name.
Interesting
- Splitting a railway into a body that owns the track and a company that runs the trains is a policy choice, and it leaves a mark here: two organisations, one network, because signalling, stations and ticketing do not divide as cleanly as the law does.
- A network with no reverse names at all across twelve addresses belongs to somebody who treats the address space as internal, whatever the routing table says.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-14, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 4 prefixes · 8.19K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| ES | Spain | 4 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS15937- Registry name
- ADIF
- Registrant
- ADIF-MNT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@adif.es
- Registered
- 1970-01-01
- Last changed
- 2018-09-04
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 2 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS15937
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 2 of 2 announcements
- Route objects
- 2 naming AS15937
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,771 prefixes, as published 2026-10-15. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere