Autonomous system
AS15932 TGS-INT-NETWORK OSLO, NORWAY
Residential RIPE NCC
Summary
Telenor Linx
telecom transit isp
The reverse names sit on a domain built from this number itself.
What it's used for
- A carrier's international network. Six IPv4 prefixes and two IPv6 prefixes announced from Norway, four thousand three hundred and fifty-two addresses, across five observed BGP neighbours.
Notable
- The one answering address returns a name on a domain that is the two letters for an autonomous system followed by this number, so the network named its reverse zone after its own routing identifier.
- That name pairs a three-letter city code with a port reference, then the same city code again with a test host for traffic measurement.
- Four blocks carry netnames ending in three-letter codes for two cities on the other side of the world, announced from a country in the far north.
- The AS handle appends a city and country in capitals, with a comma, to what is otherwise an identifier.
- One block's registry lookup failed, so its details are unknown rather than absent.
- The two IPv6 prefixes come from different ranges, one a
/32and one a/29.
Interesting
- Naming a domain after the AS number is unusually honest: it survives every rebrand, merger and change of holder, because the number is the only thing in the record that cannot be renamed.
- City codes in netnames on a carrier announcing from elsewhere mark where the equipment is, not where the company is. An international backbone's addresses live wherever it has a rack.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 3 exchanges in 3 countries, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| Equinix Internet Exchange Singapore | Singapore, Singapore | 27.111.229.37 |
| Malaysia Internet Exchange | Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia | 218.100.44.213 |
| Norwegian Internet Exchange Oslo 1 | Oslo, Norway | 185.1.55.23 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-10, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 6 prefixes · 4.35K addresses IPv6 2 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| NO | Norway | 8 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE NCC
- Registered
- 2000-11-06
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 11 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 11 authorising AS15932
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 11 of 11 announcements
- Route objects
- 20 naming AS15932
Reputation
Classification and threat
Residential Fixed-line consumer ISP. Addresses here are homes.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,775 prefixes, as published 2026-10-11. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere