asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS15932 TGS-INT-NETWORK OSLO, NORWAY

Residential RIPE NCC

IPv4 addresses 4.35K 6 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 2 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly NO
Exchanges 3 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 4 1 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Telenor Linx

Norway · AI-generated

telecom transit isp

The reverse names sit on a domain built from this number itself.

What it's used for

  • A carrier's international network. Six IPv4 prefixes and two IPv6 prefixes announced from Norway, four thousand three hundred and fifty-two addresses, across five observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • The one answering address returns a name on a domain that is the two letters for an autonomous system followed by this number, so the network named its reverse zone after its own routing identifier.
  • That name pairs a three-letter city code with a port reference, then the same city code again with a test host for traffic measurement.
  • Four blocks carry netnames ending in three-letter codes for two cities on the other side of the world, announced from a country in the far north.
  • The AS handle appends a city and country in capitals, with a comma, to what is otherwise an identifier.
  • One block's registry lookup failed, so its details are unknown rather than absent.
  • The two IPv6 prefixes come from different ranges, one a /32 and one a /29.

Interesting

  • Naming a domain after the AS number is unusually honest: it survives every rebrand, merger and change of holder, because the number is the only thing in the record that cannot be renamed.
  • City codes in netnames on a carrier announcing from elsewhere mark where the equipment is, not where the company is. An international backbone's addresses live wherever it has a rack.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 3 exchanges in 3 countries, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
Equinix Internet Exchange SingaporeSingapore, Singapore27.111.229.37
Malaysia Internet ExchangeKuala Lumpur, Malaysia218.100.44.213
Norwegian Internet Exchange Oslo 1Oslo, Norway185.1.55.23

Transit providers

4 upstream, 1 downstream and 9 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS3491PCCW Global (HK) Ltd.257
AS2914NTT America, Inc.187
AS174Cogent Communications, LLC130
AS3356Level 3 Parent, LLC18

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-10, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 6 prefixes · 4.35K addresses IPv6 2 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
NONorway8

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE NCC · via Atlas (registry data)
Registry
RIPE NCC
Registered
2000-11-06
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 11 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
11 authorising AS15932
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 11 of 11 announcements
Route objects
20 naming AS15932

Reputation

Classification and threat

Residential Fixed-line consumer ISP. Addresses here are homes.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,775 prefixes, as published 2026-10-11. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check