Autonomous system
AS15907 IKIU-ASN
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
Imam Khomeini International University of Qazvin
education research business
The block was registered and the number appeared in the routing archive twelve days apart.
What it's used for
- A university's network. One IPv4
/22announced from Iran, no IPv6, one thousand and twenty-four addresses, through a single observed BGP neighbour.
Notable
- The netname is a country code, a four-letter contraction of the university's name, and the date
20150826. - The routing archive first saw this number less than a fortnight after that date, so the block was registered and put into service in one go.
- The AS handle is that same contraction with three letters for an autonomous system number, spelled out further than the usual two.
- Everything under this number is a single route behind a single upstream.
- Three addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name.
Interesting
- Most numbers in this range were issued at the start of the century and their blocks came later or earlier by years. This one is the opposite: number, block and first announcement all belong to the same fortnight, which is what a network looks like when it was set up once and never rebuilt.
- A thousand addresses is a campus, and a single upstream is what a campus has when its connectivity comes through a national research or telecommunications provider rather than being bought on a market.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 0 downstream and 2 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS49100 | Pishgaman Toseeh Ertebatat Company (Private Joint Stock) | 94 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-26, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 1 prefixes · 1.02K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| IR | Iran (Islamic Republic of) | 2 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS15907- Registry name
- IKIU-ASN
- Registrant
- IKIU-MNT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@it.ikiu.ac.ir
- Registered
- 2015-08-27
- Last changed
- 2023-09-27
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 2 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 2 authorising AS15907
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 2 of 2 announcements
- Route objects
- 4 naming AS15907
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 443 networks and 1,779 prefixes, as published 2026-10-24. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere