asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS15892 MITTS-NET

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 3.58K 9 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly MT
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 3 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Malta Information Technology Agency

Malta · AI-generated

government infrastructure telecom

Six of the nine blocks are named prefix7, prefix10, prefix12 and so on, with gaps in the numbering.

What it's used for

  • A national government's technology agency. Nine IPv4 prefixes announced from Malta, no IPv6, three thousand five hundred and eighty-four addresses, across three observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • Three blocks carry proper netnames: a country code, an older acronym for the agency, and a date.
  • The other six are the word for a prefix with a number attached, and the numbers skip, so the series they came from had more entries than are announced here.
  • Those six list only a security operations role as registrant, with the agency's own name missing.
  • The agency's current name and its older acronym both appear, one in the registrant and one in the netnames, so the rename never reached the address records.
  • Eighteen addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name.

Interesting

  • Placeholder netnames are what a bulk import leaves behind. Somebody loaded a list of blocks into the registry, numbered them in order, and the descriptive names were only ever filled in for the three that were registered by hand.
  • A government network answering nothing in reverse DNS across eighteen addresses is a choice, not an oversight. Reverse names are free reconnaissance, and departments that publish them tend to regret it.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

3 upstream, 0 downstream and 3 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS13335Cloudflare, Inc.715
AS12709Melita Limited112
AS15735GO p.l.c.65

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-15, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 9 prefixes · 3.58K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
MTMalta9

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS15892
Registry name
MITTS-NET
Registrant
MNT-MITA
Abuse contact
securityoperations.mita@gov.mt
Registered
1970-01-01
Last changed
2024-10-31
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 14 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS15892
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 14 of 14 announcements
Route objects
42 naming AS15892

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,781 prefixes, as published 2026-10-16. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check