asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS15870 BST-AS BS-Telecom llc

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 1.28K 5 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 1 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly RU
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

BS-Telecom

Russian Federation · AI-generated

isp telecom business

Four of the five blocks carry a netname that is the company's own name with one letter wrong.

What it's used for

  • A provider's network. Five IPv4 /24s and one IPv6 /48 announced from the Russian Federation, one thousand two hundred and eighty addresses, through a single observed BGP neighbour.

Notable

  • Those four netnames differ from the registered company name by a single character in the second position, and the same wrong spelling was used four times.
  • The fifth block's netname is an organisation handle generated by the registry, with no chosen name at all.
  • Fifteen addresses were queried and all fifteen returned a name, in one scheme across every block: the word for a host with the last octet attached, then the word for a network with the first three octets hyphenated, then the company's domain.
  • That domain spells the company's name correctly, so the reverse zone and the registry disagree.
  • The IPv6 announcement is a single /48 against five separate IPv4 blocks.
  • One thousand two hundred addresses depend on a single upstream.

Interesting

  • The reverse names are the most consistent in this stretch: every address in every block follows one rule, which means the zones are generated rather than edited. The registry entries are the opposite, typed once per block, and the typo propagated because each was copied from the last.
  • Splitting the address into a host part and a network part mirrors what the routing does, and makes the block obvious from any single name.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 0 downstream and 2 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS47165Omskie kabelnye seti Ltd.347

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-04, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 5 prefixes · 1.28K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
RURussian Federation6

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS15870
Registry name
BST-AS
Registrant
MNT-OMKC
Abuse contact
abuse@bs-telecom.net
Registered
2015-08-28
Last changed
2026-06-19
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
67% valid · 4 valid, 2 with no ROA
ROAs
4 authorising AS15870
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 6 of 6 announcements
Route objects
6 naming AS15870

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 452 networks and 1,853 prefixes, as published 2026-11-05. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check