Autonomous system
AS15870 BST-AS BS-Telecom llc
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
BS-Telecom
isp telecom business
Four of the five blocks carry a netname that is the company's own name with one letter wrong.
What it's used for
- A provider's network. Five IPv4
/24s and one IPv6/48announced from the Russian Federation, one thousand two hundred and eighty addresses, through a single observed BGP neighbour.
Notable
- Those four netnames differ from the registered company name by a single character in the second position, and the same wrong spelling was used four times.
- The fifth block's netname is an organisation handle generated by the registry, with no chosen name at all.
- Fifteen addresses were queried and all fifteen returned a name, in one scheme across every block: the word for a host with the last octet attached, then the word for a network with the first three octets hyphenated, then the company's domain.
- That domain spells the company's name correctly, so the reverse zone and the registry disagree.
- The IPv6 announcement is a single
/48against five separate IPv4 blocks. - One thousand two hundred addresses depend on a single upstream.
Interesting
- The reverse names are the most consistent in this stretch: every address in every block follows one rule, which means the zones are generated rather than edited. The registry entries are the opposite, typed once per block, and the typo propagated because each was copied from the last.
- Splitting the address into a host part and a network part mirrors what the routing does, and makes the block obvious from any single name.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 0 downstream and 2 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS47165 | Omskie kabelnye seti Ltd. | 347 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-04, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 5 prefixes · 1.28K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| RU | Russian Federation | 6 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS15870- Registry name
- BST-AS
- Registrant
- MNT-OMKC
- Abuse contact
- abuse@bs-telecom.net
- Registered
- 2015-08-28
- Last changed
- 2026-06-19
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 67% valid · 4 valid, 2 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 4 authorising AS15870
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 6 of 6 announcements
- Route objects
- 6 naming AS15870
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 452 networks and 1,853 prefixes, as published 2026-11-05. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere