asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS15840 ATT-INF001-A11 AT&T-GNS-AS15840 dr6348

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 256 1 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly NL
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

AT&T Global Network Services Nederland

Netherlands · AI-generated

enterprise business telecom

The handle ends in what reads as an internal ticket reference, in lower case.

What it's used for

  • A managed network provider's country entity. One IPv4 /24 announced from the Netherlands, no IPv6, two hundred and fifty-six addresses, through a single observed BGP neighbour.

Notable

  • The AS handle is three parts: an inventory-style code with a three-digit number and a letter-digit suffix, then the group's initials with a division abbreviation and this AS number attached, then two lower-case letters and four digits.
  • That last part follows no registry convention and reads as a change or ticket reference from whatever system the record was raised in.
  • The netname begins with a country code for a country other than the one the block is announced from, followed by an abbreviation for information technology professionals.
  • The block lists the country entity and a role named after the registry's abuse field.
  • The routing archive did not see this number until nearly two decades after the numbers around it.
  • Three addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name.

Interesting

  • Global managed-network businesses run one autonomous system per country entity for legal and billing reasons, and populate the registry from an internal asset database. What leaks through is the database's own vocabulary: asset codes, division abbreviations and the reference of the request that created the record.
  • A country code in a netname that disagrees with the announcement is a block moved between entities without the name being touched.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS2686AT&T Enterprises, LLC61

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-30, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 1 prefixes · 256 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
NLNetherlands1

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS15840
Registry name
ATT-INF001-A11
Registrant
MAINT-AS2686
Abuse contact
peering@intl.att.com
Registered
1970-01-01
Last changed
2018-09-04
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 1 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS15840
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 1 of 1 announcements
Route objects
1 naming AS15840

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 447 networks and 1,848 prefixes, as published 2026-10-31. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check