asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS15822 AGEN-AS Agencija RS za energijo AS

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 256 1 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly SI
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 2 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Agencija za energijo

Slovenia · AI-generated

government business infrastructure

The handle says autonomous system twice: once inside its first token and once at the end.

What it's used for

  • A national energy regulator's network. One IPv4 /24 announced from Slovenia, no IPv6, two hundred and fifty-six addresses, across two observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • The AS handle begins with a four-letter abbreviation joined to the two letters for an autonomous system, then writes the agency's full name, then adds those two letters again.
  • The holder string writes that name entirely in capitals, and the handle writes the same name in ordinary case with the state's abbreviation in the middle.
  • The netname is a country code, the same abbreviation and that state abbreviation.
  • The second registrant is the abbreviation and the state code with nothing else, so a contact and a netname share a name.
  • Two hundred and fifty-six addresses are announced as one route.
  • Three addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name.

Interesting

  • Energy regulators sit between the companies that generate power and the ones that deliver it, ruling on prices and access. It is a job done in documents and hearings, which is why the network is one block and two upstreams.
  • A repeated suffix in a handle is what happens when a field already ends in the thing the form asks you to append. The instruction was followed exactly, and the result says it twice.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

2 upstream, 0 downstream and 2 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS5603Telekom Slovenije, d.d.59
AS21283A1 Slovenija telekomunikacijske storitve,d.d.2

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-18, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 1 prefixes · 256 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
SISlovenia1

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS15822
Registry name
AGEN-AS
Registrant
AS5603-MNT
Abuse contact
matjaz.krajnc@agen-rs.si
Registered
2006-07-25
Last changed
2020-05-19
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 1 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
1 authorising AS15822
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 1 of 1 announcements
Route objects
1 naming AS15822

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,784 prefixes, as published 2026-10-19. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check