asn.dev

Routing security

AS15804 AS15804

Unclassified AFRINIC

RPKI valid 0% 0 of 29 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 29 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 0% 29 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 0 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

29 observed

Every prefix observed with AS15804 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
212.12.224.0/24No ROANo IRR52
212.12.225.0/24No ROANo IRR52
212.12.226.0/24No ROANo IRR52
212.12.227.0/24No ROANo IRR52
212.12.229.0/24No ROANo IRR52
212.12.231.0/24No ROANo IRR52
212.12.232.0/24No ROANo IRR52
212.12.233.0/24No ROANo IRR52
212.12.234.0/24No ROANo IRR52
212.12.235.0/24No ROANo IRR52
212.12.236.0/24No ROANo IRR52
212.12.237.0/24No ROANo IRR52
212.12.238.0/24No ROANo IRR52
212.12.239.0/24No ROANo IRR52
212.12.240.0/24No ROANo IRR52
212.12.241.0/24No ROANo IRR52
212.12.242.0/24No ROANo IRR52
212.12.243.0/24No ROANo IRR52
212.12.244.0/24No ROANo IRR52
212.12.245.0/24No ROANo IRR52
212.12.246.0/24No ROANo IRR52
212.12.247.0/24No ROANo IRR52
212.12.248.0/24No ROANo IRR52
212.12.249.0/24No ROANo IRR52
212.12.250.0/24No ROANo IRR52
212.12.251.0/24No ROANo IRR52
212.12.252.0/24No ROANo IRR52
212.12.254.0/24No ROANo IRR52
212.12.255.0/24No ROANo IRR52

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

0 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS15804 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

No ROA names this AS as an authorised origin.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

0 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS15804 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

No route objects name this AS as origin.

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS15804 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-36992RIPELists AS15804 as a direct member
AS-ETISALAT_MISRRIPELists AS15804 as a direct member
AS-LINKDOTNETAFRINICLists AS15804 as a direct member
AS-LINKDOTNETRIPELists AS15804 as a direct member
AS-NOLPRIPELists AS15804 as a direct member
AS-NOLTAFRINICLists AS15804 as a direct member
AS-NOLTRIPELists AS15804 as a direct member
AS-NOORAFRINICLists AS15804 as a direct member
AS-NOOR-CRIPELists AS15804 as a direct member
AS-NOORTRIPELists AS15804 as a direct member
AS-RAYAAFRINICLists AS15804 as a direct member
AS-RAYARIPELists AS15804 as a direct member
AS-SEABONECUSTMEAFRIPELists AS15804 as a direct member
AS-SET-AFRIXRIPELists AS15804 as a direct member
AS-TEDATAAFRINICLists AS15804 as a direct member
AS-TEDATARIPELists AS15804 as a direct member
AS3491:AS-CUSTOMERS-EURADBLists AS15804 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-27 12:06 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-27. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.