Autonomous system
AS15776 International Business Machines of Belgium Ltd
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
International Business Machines Belgium
enterprise business hosting
A block belonging to the company that was spun out of this one, still announced from inside it.
What it's used for
- A technology company's country network. Two IPv4 prefixes and one IPv6
/40announced from Belgium, seven hundred and sixty-eight addresses, across three observed BGP neighbours.
Notable
- One block's netname is
KYN-GTS-129-35, and its registrant is the services business that was separated from this company into its own listed firm. - That netname is three parts: an abbreviation of the new company, another abbreviation, and the first two octets of the block.
- The other block's netname is a country code, the company's three initials and a four-character suffix written partly in lower case, which no other netname in this range does.
- Its only listed contact is a role named after the registry's abuse field.
- The AS handle is the three initials, a city and a country, with no separator but a comma.
- Six addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name.
Interesting
- Corporate separations divide the staff and the contracts on a stated date, and divide the addresses whenever somebody gets round to it. The registry entry has been updated to name the new owner while the routing has not moved, so the block is registered to one company and announced by another.
- Seven hundred addresses is a small footprint for a name this size, which is what happens when the bulk of the work moved to shared platforms elsewhere.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-15, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 2 prefixes · 768 addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| BE | Belgium | 3 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS15776- Registry name
- UNSPECIFIED
- Registrant
- lir-us-kyndryl-1-MNT
- Abuse contact
- peering@intl.att.com
- Registered
- 2002-06-14
- Last changed
- 2025-11-21
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 33% valid · 1 valid, 2 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 1 authorising AS15776
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 3 of 3 announcements
- Route objects
- 3 naming AS15776
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 454 networks and 1,849 prefixes, as published 2026-11-14. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere