asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS15757 GASCOM-NET

Unclassified ARIN

IPv4 addresses 19.46K 9 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly RU
Exchanges 1 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 6 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Gazprom Space Systems

Russian Federation · AI-generated

isp telecom infrastructure business

The one answering name keeps the dots in the address, so each octet becomes its own DNS label.

What it's used for

  • A satellite operator's network. Nine IPv4 prefixes announced from the Russian Federation, no IPv6, nineteen thousand four hundred and fifty-six addresses, across thirteen observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • The single answering name is host-94.124.229.254.gascom.net.ru: the word for a host, a hyphen, then the address with its dots left in place.
  • Most operators hyphenate the octets so the address forms one label. Keeping the dots turns the four octets into four separate levels of the name, and the zone has to exist at each of them.
  • Eight blocks use a country code, the brand and a date, with four of them sharing one date from the year two thousand.
  • A ninth uses the brand and the word for internet, and lists only an abuse team.
  • That abuse team's name includes the registry's own initials, so the registry appears inside a company contact.
  • One block's registry lookup failed, so its details are unknown rather than absent.
  • Of eighteen addresses queried, one returned a name.

Interesting

  • Four blocks sharing one allocation date means a single request that was split into pieces on the day it was granted, rather than growth over time.
  • Thirteen neighbours on a network this size is a lot for an operator whose distribution is by satellite. The peering happens on the ground; the satellite is the last hop, not the first.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
MSK-IX MoscowMoscow, Russia195.208.208.220

Transit providers

6 upstream, 0 downstream and 6 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS12389PJSC Rostelecom509
AS20764CJSC RASCOM85
AS59589LLC KA-218
AS24482SG.GS4
AS49673Truenetwork LLC4
AS62143FSUE RTRN3

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-18, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 9 prefixes · 19.46K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
RURussian Federation9

Registry

Allocation record

ARIN · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
ARIN
Handle
AS15757
Registry name
Gascom-Net
Registrant
GASCOM-MNT
Abuse contact
abuse@gascom.ru
Registered
2002-06-07
Last changed
2025-03-24
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 10 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
4 authorising AS15757
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 10 of 10 announcements
Route objects
33 naming AS15757

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 443 networks and 1,784 prefixes, as published 2026-10-19. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check