asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS15706 Sudatel

Unclassified ARIN Cable/DSL/ISP

IPv4 addresses 131K 74 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 1 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly SD
Exchanges 1 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 3 3 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Sudatel

Sudan · AI-generated

isp telecom government business

Every block's netname is the registry's own organisation handle, seventy times over.

What it's used for

  • The national telecoms operator. Seventy-four IPv4 prefixes and one IPv6 prefix announced from Sudan, one hundred and thirty-one thousand addresses, across seven observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • Nearly every block carries the same netname, and that netname is the internal handle of the organisation record: a prefix, an abbreviation with a number, and the registry's name.
  • One block breaks the pattern with no netname at all and a registrant described only as a contact person.
  • The holder string is the company's full name written twice, separated by a spaced hyphen, with the parenthesised long form included both times.
  • The seventy-four blocks come from four unrelated ranges and are announced in pieces from /18 down.
  • Seven neighbours carry one hundred and thirty-one thousand addresses.
  • Eighteen addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name.

Interesting

  • Seven upstreams for a country's incumbent operator is a small number, and it is the number that matters most here. Everything reachable behind this network depends on those seven, and the addresses say nothing about how many of them are usable at once.
  • Reusing the organisation handle as the netname on every block means the registry can tell who owns the space and nothing can tell one block from another. The distinguishing field was spent on the fact all of them share.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
AMS-IX DjiboutiDjibouti City, Djibouti196.223.38.108

Transit providers

3 upstream, 3 downstream and 9 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS39386Saudi Telecom Company JSC7,130
AS174Cogent Communications, LLC4,412
AS204523Expresso Telecom Group Ltd1,142

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 74 prefixes · 131K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
SDSudan75

Registry

Allocation record

ARIN · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
ARIN
Handle
AS15706
Registry name
ORG-SA54-AFRINIC
Registrant
Sudatel (Sudan Telecom Co. Ltd)
Registered
2007-01-25
Last changed
2024-07-17
Allocation
allocated

Declared

PeeringDB profile

self-reported
Name
Sudatel Telecom Group
Network type
Cable/DSL/ISP
Scope
Not Disclosed
Traffic ratio
Mostly Outbound
Peering policy
Open
IRR as-set
AFRINIC::AS-SUDATEL
Present at
3 exchanges
Facilities
1 facilities
Website
http://www.sudatel.sd

PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 215 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
7 authorising AS15706
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 215 of 215 announcements
Route objects
46 naming AS15706

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check