Autonomous system
AS15679 CIS
Unclassified RIPE NCC
Summary
CIS Ministry Transport, Communication, and Information Technology
government telecom business
Half the blocks list an abuse role and no organisation at all.
What it's used for
- A government ministry's network. Four IPv4 prefixes announced from Oman, no IPv6, one thousand two hundred and eighty addresses, through two observed BGP neighbours.
Notable
- Two of the four blocks name only an abuse role as their registrant. No company, no ministry, no department appears on either.
- Those two use netnames from a different abbreviation than the other two, one with a numeric suffix and one with a two-letter one.
- The other two blocks carry a country code, the holder abbreviation and an allocation date, and list the ministry together with a contact whose name ends in the abbreviation for a local registry.
- The AS handle is three letters that mean several other things, with nothing to tie it to the holder.
- Twelve addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name.
Interesting
- A registrant field holding only an abuse role is the registry's minimum viable record. Someone can still be contacted, and there is no way to tell from the record who owns the addresses.
- The two netname families point at two separate registrations that ended up under one number. The dated pair was filed together; the undated pair has no filing date recorded anywhere.
- One thousand two hundred and eighty addresses across four blocks, with the largest a
/23, is a ministry that grew its allocation a piece at a time.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-10, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 4 prefixes · 1.28K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| OM | Oman | 4 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE NCC
- Registered
- 2009-07-31
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 5 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS15679
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 5 of 5 announcements
- Route objects
- 13 naming AS15679
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,775 prefixes, as published 2026-10-11. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere