Autonomous system
AS15675 ETAT-DE-VAUD
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
Etat de Vaud
government enterprise business
Twenty-eight routes carve up one range, and not one of them is the whole thing.
What it's used for
- A cantonal government's network. Twenty-eight IPv4 prefixes announced from Switzerland, no IPv6, sixty-nine thousand addresses, through three observed BGP neighbours.
Notable
- Most of the twenty-eight blocks come out of one range, split into pieces from
/19down to/24, with the covering block never announced on its own. - Every one of those blocks carries the identical netname and the identical registrant, so the split exists in routing and nowhere in the registry.
- Four further blocks sit in unrelated ranges, and they carry the same netname too.
- The holder string names the canton twice, once hyphenated at the front and once spaced at the end, with the department's full title between them.
- A second contact on every block is a security team rather than a network one.
- Eighteen addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name.
Interesting
- Announcing the pieces but never the cover means every one of them has to be carried separately by every network on the internet. One route would reach the same addresses; twenty-eight is what survives when each site gets its own announcement and nobody adds the summary.
- Listing a security team as a registry contact is unusual and sensible. The address record is where an outside report starts, and pointing it at the people who handle reports skips a step.
- Sixty-nine thousand addresses with no IPv6 at all is a large network that has not needed to move.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-14, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 28 prefixes · 69.38K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| CH | Switzerland | 28 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS15675- Registry name
- Etat-de-Vaud
- Registrant
- ETAT-DE-VAUD-MNT
- Abuse contact
- securite.ssi@vd.ch
- Registered
- 1970-01-01
- Last changed
- 2024-10-02
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 90% valid · 28 valid, 3 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 28 authorising AS15675
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 31 of 31 announcements
- Route objects
- 51 naming AS15675
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,773 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere