asn.dev

Routing security

AS15670 BBNED-AS #1

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 2 of 2 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 24 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

2 observed

Every prefix observed with AS15670 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
62.177.128.0/17RPKI validIRR51
82.204.0.0/17RPKI validIRR51

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

24 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS15670 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
62.177.128.0/17/24RIPENCC
62.177.128.0/24/24RIPENCC
62.177.133.0/24/24RIPENCC
62.177.136.0/22/24RIPENCC
62.177.144.0/24/24RIPENCC
62.177.146.0/23/24RIPENCC
62.177.148.0/24/24RIPENCC
62.177.150.0/23/24RIPENCC
62.177.152.0/21/24RIPENCC
62.177.160.0/21/24RIPENCC
62.177.168.0/24/24RIPENCC
62.177.170.0/23/24RIPENCC
62.177.172.0/22/24RIPENCC
62.177.176.0/20/24RIPENCC
62.177.192.0/18/24RIPENCC
82.204.0.0/17/24RIPENCC
82.204.0.0/18/24RIPENCC
82.204.10.0/24/24RIPENCC
82.204.28.0/22/24RIPENCC
82.204.48.0/20/24RIPENCC
82.204.64.0/19/24RIPENCC
82.204.68.0/23/24RIPENCC
82.204.120.0/22/24RIPENCC
82.204.126.0/24/24RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

4 objects · 2 not announced

Route objects naming AS15670 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
78.27.0.0/18RIPEBBeyond's aggregation IP blockBBYN-MNT2013-02-07Not announced
93.125.128.0/17RIPEBBeyond's aggregation IP blockBBYN-MNT2013-02-07Not announced
62.177.128.0/17RIPEBBned's aggregation IP blockNL-BBNET-MNT2013-02-07Announced
82.204.0.0/17RIPEBBned Aggregation IP blockNL-BBNET-MNT2013-02-07Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS15670 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-DDITS:AS-PEERSRIPELists AS15670 as a direct member
AS-DOCLER:AS-PEERSRIPELists AS15670 as a direct member
AS-EBONERIPELists AS15670 as a direct member
AS-INTERNLNETRIPELists AS15670 as a direct member
AS-NETHOLDINGRIPELists AS15670 as a direct member
AS-OPENPEERINGPEERSRIPELists AS15670 as a direct member
AS-OXILION-PEERSRIPELists AS15670 as a direct member
AS-VERSATELRIPELists AS15670 as a direct member
AS16243:AS-PEERS-AMSIXRIPELists AS15670 as a direct member
AS28747:AS-AMS-IX-PEERSRIPELists AS15670 as a direct member
AS34968:AS-AMS-IX-PEERSRIPELists AS15670 as a direct member
AS34968:AS-NL-IX-PEERSRIPELists AS15670 as a direct member
AS50295:AS-PEERS-AMSIXRIPELists AS15670 as a direct member
AS50295:AS-PEERS-NLIXRIPELists AS15670 as a direct member
AS51088:AS-PEERS-AMSIXRIPELists AS15670 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-16 12:09 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-16. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.