asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS15562 SNIJDERS

Unclassified RIPE Educational/Research

IPv4 addresses 2.37K 8 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 6 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly NL
Exchanges 2 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 6 1 downstream
Flagged prefixes 1 see address space

Summary

Individually held network

Netherlands · AI-generated

research measurement infrastructure

One of the announcements is a /26, far smaller than the global routing table normally carries.

What it's used for

  • A network held by an individual rather than a company. Ten IPv4 prefixes and six IPv6 prefixes announced from the Netherlands, three thousand addresses, across nine observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • One IPv4 announcement is a /26, four times smaller than the smallest size most networks will accept from a peer, so it can only be useful where a specific arrangement carries it.
  • Not one of the ten IPv4 blocks is registered to the holder. Six belong to one global carrier, one to a hardware and software vendor, one to that carrier's national arm, and one to two named individuals.
  • The six IPv6 prefixes come from six unrelated ranges, including one the registry uses for measurement infrastructure.
  • Blocks span address space administered by two different regional registries while being announced from one country.
  • Eighteen addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name.

Interesting

  • A network assembled entirely from other people's address space is what an operator running experiments looks like. The blocks are borrowed, the announcements are the point.
  • Announcing a /26 is not an error so much as a demonstration. It shows exactly which paths carry prefixes that long, which is information you cannot get any other way.
  • Six IPv6 prefixes and ten IPv4 ones on three thousand addresses is heavily weighted toward the newer protocol, which is the opposite of almost everything else in this range.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 2 exchanges in 2 countries, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
The Frys Internet ExchangeFrysian, Netherlands2001:7f8:10f::3cca:208
YYCIX Calgary Internet ExchangeCalgary, Canada206.126.225.42

Transit providers

6 upstream, 1 downstream and 11 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS51088A2B IP B.V.259
AS2914NTT America, Inc.223
AS3257GTT Communications Inc.69
AS6939Hurricane Electric LLC68
AS206238Freedom Internet BV11
AS394256Tech Futures Interactive Inc.2

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-10, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 8 prefixes · 2.37K addresses IPv6 6 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
NLNetherlands14

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS15562
Registry name
SNIJDERS
Registrant
Job Snijders
Abuse contact
job@bsd.nl
Registered
2002-05-04
Last changed
2021-01-26
Allocation
allocated

Declared

PeeringDB profile

self-reported
Name
Job Snijders
Also known as
BSD
Network type
Educational/Research
Scope
Global
Traffic ratio
Balanced
Peering policy
Selective
IRR as-set
AS15562:AS-SNIJDERS
Present at
2 exchanges
Facilities
2 facilities
Website
https://www.bsd.nl/

PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
93% valid · 14 valid, 0 with no ROA 1 RPKI-invalid
ROAs
14 authorising AS15562
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
80% registered · 12 of 15 announcements 1 other origin
Route objects
23 naming AS15562

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,775 prefixes, as published 2026-10-11. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check