asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS15549 Astana, Kazakhstan

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 3.07K 7 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly KZ
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 3 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

National Information Technologies

Kazakhstan · AI-generated

government infrastructure business

One netname names a supercomputer; four blocks name no owner at all.

What it's used for

  • A state technology company's network. Seven IPv4 prefixes announced from Kazakhstan, no IPv6, three thousand addresses, across eight observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • Three blocks share one netname built from the country code, a word for a banking network and a six-digit date with a two-digit year.
  • The other four each have a one-off netname with underscores: one naming a supercomputing facility, one a corporate network, one an investment project, and one a short code.
  • Those same four list only an abuse role as registrant, with no company named, so more than half the blocks have no owner in the registry.
  • All seven come from one range, split into sizes from a /22 down to four separate /24 prefixes.
  • Eighteen addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name.

Interesting

  • A banking network name from the nineties now held by a state technology company is a transfer of function written into a field nobody updates. The network changed hands and the label did not.
  • Naming a supercomputing facility in a netname is a small disclosure with real value to anyone mapping which addresses matter.
  • Routing history first records this network more than a decade after the numbers around it appeared, which means the number is considerably older than its use.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

3 upstream, 0 downstream and 4 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS21299Kar-Tel LLC472
AS35104QMOBILE JSC179
AS41798JSC Transtelecom70

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-14, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 7 prefixes · 3.07K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
KZKazakhstan7

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS15549
Registry name
UNSPECIFIED
Registrant
AS15549-MNT
Abuse contact
konstantin.shramchenko@nitec.kz
Registered
1970-01-01
Last changed
2020-10-30
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 12 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS15549
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 12 of 12 announcements
Route objects
15 naming AS15549

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,771 prefixes, as published 2026-10-15. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check