asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS15541 CETI-AS CETI ISP, Poland

Hosting RIPE

IPv4 addresses 4.61K 12 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly PL
Exchanges 1 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 5 2 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

CETI

Poland · AI-generated

isp hosting business

Seventeen of eighteen addresses answer, and the two exceptions sit on a different domain.

What it's used for

  • A regional internet provider. Twelve IPv4 prefixes announced from Poland, no IPv6, four and a half thousand addresses, across nine observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • Fifteen answering addresses use one form: a two-letter prefix, the address in dashes, and a three-label domain.
  • The two exceptions use a shorter domain instead. One names an ethernet interface on a host; the other is a virtual host, with the third and last octets run together into a single number with no separator.
  • Eleven of the twelve blocks share one netname and one allocation date; the twelfth substitutes its own third octet for the date and drops the company from its registrant list.
  • The block is held by an individual trading as a partnership, so the registrant is a person rather than a company.
  • Eighteen addresses were queried for reverse DNS and seventeen returned a name.

Interesting

  • Running the third and last octet together produces a number that reads as one value but is two. It works because the operator knows the convention, and it is unparseable to anyone who does not.
  • Two domains in one zone, with infrastructure on the short one and customers on the long one, is a sensible split: it keeps the routers findable by people who need them and everything else generic.
  • Twelve routes from one contiguous range, none of them adjacent enough to merge, is the fragmentation that comes from growing a /24 at a time.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
TPIX - Internet ExchangeWarsaw, Poland195.149.233.54

Transit providers

5 upstream, 2 downstream and 7 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS9141P4 Sp. z o.o.781
AS42927S-NET Sp. z o.o.181
AS33891Core-Backbone GmbH53
AS24482SG.GS18
AS6939Hurricane Electric LLC11

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-18, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 12 prefixes · 4.61K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
PLPoland12

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS15541
Registry name
CETI-AS
Registrant
AS15541-MNT
Abuse contact
abuse@tech.ceti.pl
Registered
2002-04-17
Last changed
2017-11-15
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 18 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
19 authorising AS15541
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 18 of 18 announcements
Route objects
9 naming AS15541

Reputation

Classification and threat

Hosting Datacenter or cloud provider. Addresses are servers, not people.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,784 prefixes, as published 2026-10-19. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check