Autonomous system
AS15541 CETI-AS CETI ISP, Poland
Hosting RIPE
Summary
CETI
isp hosting business
Seventeen of eighteen addresses answer, and the two exceptions sit on a different domain.
What it's used for
- A regional internet provider. Twelve IPv4 prefixes announced from Poland, no IPv6, four and a half thousand addresses, across nine observed BGP neighbours.
Notable
- Fifteen answering addresses use one form: a two-letter prefix, the address in dashes, and a three-label domain.
- The two exceptions use a shorter domain instead. One names an ethernet interface on a host; the other is a virtual host, with the third and last octets run together into a single number with no separator.
- Eleven of the twelve blocks share one netname and one allocation date; the twelfth substitutes its own third octet for the date and drops the company from its registrant list.
- The block is held by an individual trading as a partnership, so the registrant is a person rather than a company.
- Eighteen addresses were queried for reverse DNS and seventeen returned a name.
Interesting
- Running the third and last octet together produces a number that reads as one value but is two. It works because the operator knows the convention, and it is unparseable to anyone who does not.
- Two domains in one zone, with infrastructure on the short one and customers on the long one, is a sensible split: it keeps the routers findable by people who need them and everything else generic.
- Twelve routes from one contiguous range, none of them adjacent enough to merge, is the fragmentation that comes from growing a
/24at a time.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| TPIX - Internet Exchange | Warsaw, Poland | 195.149.233.54 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-19, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 12 prefixes · 4.61K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| PL | Poland | 12 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS15541- Registry name
- CETI-AS
- Registrant
- AS15541-MNT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@tech.ceti.pl
- Registered
- 2002-04-17
- Last changed
- 2017-11-15
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 18 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 19 authorising AS15541
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 18 of 18 announcements
- Route objects
- 9 naming AS15541
Reputation
Classification and threat
Hosting Datacenter or cloud provider. Addresses are servers, not people.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,783 prefixes, as published 2026-10-20. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere