Autonomous system
AS15425 COMA
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
PODA
isp telecom infrastructure
Four different brands across one network, and a town's own domain among the customer names.
What it's used for
- A regional internet provider. Eight IPv4 prefixes and one IPv6
/32announced from Czechia, one hundred and ten thousand addresses, through one observed BGP neighbour.
Notable
- The AS handle is one company name and the holder is another, neither of which is the domain the reverse names use.
- Eleven of the twelve answering addresses take the form of two letters, then the full address padded with zeroes to twelve digits, under that third domain. Some add a word for static in front and some do not.
- The twelfth answers with a municipality's own domain, so a town's network sits inside the provider's address space.
- All eight netnames follow one pattern of country code, holder and allocation date, spanning many years.
- Eighteen addresses were queried for reverse DNS and twelve returned a name.
Interesting
- Zero padding every octet to three digits makes the names sort correctly as text, which is a small kindness to anyone reading logs and an old habit among providers who did.
- One hundred and ten thousand addresses behind a single observed neighbour is the number to question. Either the collectors see only one path, or a large regional network depends on one.
- The town domain is the useful find. It marks which addresses serve a public authority rather than households, and nothing else in the record would tell you.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 0 downstream and 2 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS30764 | PODA a.s. | 506 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-16, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 8 prefixes · 111K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| CZ | Czechia | 9 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS15425- Registry name
- COMA
- Registrant
- PODA a.s.
- Abuse contact
- abuse@poda.cz
- Registered
- 2004-07-14
- Last changed
- 2019-03-21
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 9 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 9 authorising AS15425
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 9 of 9 announcements
- Route objects
- 71 naming AS15425
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,783 prefixes, as published 2026-10-17. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere