Autonomous system
AS15396 ICM-COM ICM
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
ICM, University of Warsaw
education research infrastructure
The reverse names say plainly that these addresses are core routers.
What it's used for
- A university computing centre's network. A single IPv4
/24announced from Poland, no IPv6, through two observed BGP neighbours.
Notable
- Every sampled address answered, each with the AS handle, then the full address in dashes, then two labels reading as router and core, under the centre's academic domain.
- The netname is the country code, the centre's three letter abbreviation, and the allocation date.
- The registrant names the university with a word missing from its usual form, and a network department alongside it.
- Three addresses were queried for reverse DNS and three returned a name.
- Two hundred and fifty-six addresses, all of them apparently named.
Interesting
- Naming a device by its role in public DNS is a habit from academic networking, where operators documented their infrastructure for each other. It makes troubleshooting a traceroute far easier.
- It also tells anybody looking exactly which addresses carry the routers rather than the servers, which is a targeting hint given away for free.
- University supercomputing centres often hold address space out of proportion to their size. This one does not, which suggests the research traffic leaves by a different number.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 1 prefixes · 256 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| PL | Poland | 1 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS15396- Registry name
- ICM-COM
- Registrant
- ICM-PL
- Abuse contact
- abuse@uw.edu.pl
- Registered
- 1970-01-01
- Last changed
- 2018-09-04
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 1 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS15396
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 1 of 1 announcements
- Route objects
- 1 naming AS15396
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,773 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere