asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS15380 ANSCZ is czech national air traffic control organisation

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 256 1 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 1 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly CZ
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 2 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Air Navigation Services of the Czech Republic

Czechia · AI-generated

government infrastructure enterprise

The AS handle field carries a sentence explaining what the organisation is, in lower case.

What it's used for

  • A national air traffic control provider. A single IPv4 /24 and one IPv6 /48 announced from Czechia, across two observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • The handle field holds the five letter abbreviation followed by a plain sentence saying it is the national air traffic control organisation, written without capitals.
  • The netname is the same abbreviation with a hyphen inserted, and the registrant is the full legal name including the words state enterprise.
  • Three addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name.
  • Two hundred and fifty-six addresses and one IPv6 block, announced through two upstreams.

Interesting

  • Someone filled a name field with an explanation, and it survives because registries store what they are given. It is more informative than the abbreviation it accompanies.
  • Air traffic control runs on dedicated aviation networks, not the public internet. What is announced here is the organisation's ordinary corporate presence, and the small size reflects that.
  • Announcing IPv6 alongside a single IPv4 block is more than many state enterprises manage, and it costs nothing to have ready before it is needed.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

2 upstream, 0 downstream and 3 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS5610O2 Czech Republic, a.s.57
AS6855Slovak Telekom, a.s.35

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-15, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 1 prefixes · 256 addresses IPv6 1 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
CZCzechia2

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS15380
Registry name
ANSCZ
Registrant
ANS-MNT
Abuse contact
filip.dvorak@ans.cz
Registered
2002-11-04
Last changed
2017-11-15
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 2 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
4 authorising AS15380
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 2 of 2 announcements
Route objects
4 naming AS15380

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,782 prefixes, as published 2026-10-16. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check