asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS15321 GROUPE-MASKATEL-LP

Unclassified ARIN

IPv4 addresses 49.92K 57 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly CA
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Groupe Maskatel

Canada · AI-generated

isp telecom business infrastructure

Netnames encoding a date, a counter and a country code, with a stem that changes length each time.

What it's used for

  • A regional telephone and internet group. Fifty-five IPv4 prefixes announced from Canada, forty-eight thousand addresses, across two observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • Three blocks carry netnames built from a stem, a five digit number, a fixed six digit code, a small number, an eight digit date and a country code, and the stem is written three different lengths in three otherwise identical labels.
  • Several blocks carry the group's netname while being registered to a different telecommunications company, so the label and the owner disagree by design.
  • Another company's blocks use their own short netname, keeping their identity inside the group's routing.
  • Reverse names combine a letter and digit prefix, the full address, a dynamic or static marker, and a three or four letter town code before the group's domain.
  • One block's registry lookup failed, so nothing can be said about who holds it.

Interesting

  • The town codes make the reverse names a map. Each answer says which exchange the subscriber is on, which is how a support desk triages a fault and also how an outsider infers the network's geography.
  • Dates in netnames are provisioning receipts, and the varying stem length shows they are typed rather than generated. Three attempts at the same format produced three different results.
  • A group assembled from smaller carriers shows up as exactly this: one netname where the paperwork was updated, the original one where it was not.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS577Bell Canada4,023

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-15, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 57 prefixes · 49.92K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
CACanada57

Registry

Allocation record

ARIN · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
ARIN
Handle
AS15321
Registry name
GROUPE-MASKATEL-LP
Registrant
Groupe Maskatel
Abuse contact
abuseinternet@maskatel.qc.ca
Registered
2008-12-29
Last changed
2014-01-09
Allocation
assigned

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
78% valid · 54 valid, 15 with no ROA
ROAs
52 authorising AS15321
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
88% registered · 61 of 69 announcements 1 other origin
Route objects
54 naming AS15321

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,782 prefixes, as published 2026-10-16. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check