asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS15290 ZAYO-CAN-15290

Unclassified ARIN

IPv4 addresses 20.74K 72 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 20 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly US
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 2 24 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Zayo Bandwidth

United States · AI-generated

transit telecom isp infrastructure

Ninety-five prefixes, netnames numbered with gaps, and reverse DNS under an acquired carrier.

What it's used for

  • A wholesale network carrying its own and its customers' address space. Seventy-five IPv4 prefixes and twenty IPv6 prefixes announced, twenty-one thousand addresses in total, across twenty-seven observed neighbours.

Notable

  • Netnames follow one stem with a counter, but the counters seen here skip: seven, nine, fifteen and twenty-five, with one written as ZAYO-CAN--9 using two hyphens where the others use one.
  • Two blocks inside the range are registered to a security company rather than the carrier, under a default netname that begins with a leading zero before the address.
  • The AS handle ends in this AS number, so the identifier contains itself.
  • Three of eighteen sampled addresses answered, all under a different carrier's domain, the name of a company that no longer trades under it.
  • One block's registry lookup failed, so nothing can be said about who holds it.

Interesting

  • Reverse DNS under a predecessor's domain dates the acquisition better than any registry field. The zone still resolves, the addresses still answer, and renaming them would break nothing except the historical record.
  • Customer blocks sitting inside a carrier's numbered series is how wholesale works: the carrier announces the route, the customer holds the registration, and only the netname shows the difference.
  • The doubled hyphen is a typing slip that became permanent. Netnames are set once and rarely corrected, so small errors persist for decades.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

2 upstream, 24 downstream and 29 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS6461Zayo Bandwidth5,326
AS577Bell Canada60

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-15, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 72 prefixes · 20.74K addresses IPv6 20 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
USUnited States of America92

Registry

Allocation record

ARIN · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
ARIN
Handle
AS15290
Registry name
ZAYO-CAN-15290
Registrant
Zayo Bandwidth
Abuse contact
abuse@zayo.com
Registered
2000-04-13
Last changed
2025-06-20
Allocation
assigned

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
91% valid · 92 valid, 9 with no ROA
ROAs
152 authorising AS15290
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
21% registered · 21 of 101 announcements
Route objects
375 naming AS15290

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,782 prefixes, as published 2026-10-16. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check