Autonomous system
AS15220 -Reserved AS-
Unclassified ARIN
Summary
AS15220
hosting business
One netname ends in the number of the AS that announces it.
What it's used for
- Three IPv4
/24blocks announced through a single observed BGP neighbour. The holder lookup failed, so nothing can be said about who the number is assigned to.
Notable
- Two netnames share a prefix naming a hosting provider, a three-letter site code and a customer, and differ only in the number on the end. One of those numbers is this AS number itself.
- The third block carries an unrelated netname of three letters and a country code.
- The AS handle is a reserved placeholder rather than a name, the third such handle in this range that is announcing routes.
- Nine addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name.
- The routing history begins in 2001, later than most of its neighbours in this range.
Interesting
- A netname containing the AS number is the closest thing in these records to a cross-reference. It was almost certainly typed by hand, from a ticket that mentioned both, and it works: the label ties the block to the routing in a way no field is designed to.
- The other number in the matching netname is not an AS number at all, which is the problem with conventions that emerge rather than get specified. Two labels that look alike mean different things.
- Three blocks from two providers, a failed holder lookup, an unknown country and no reverse names. What is visible is a customer identified only by a code inside somebody else's naming scheme.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-24, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 3 prefixes · 768 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| Unknown | 3 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- ARIN
- Allocation
- reserved
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 3 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS15220
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 3 of 3 announcements
- Route objects
- 4 naming AS15220
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,779 prefixes, as published 2026-10-24. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere