asn.dev

Routing security

AS150389 SPRINTNET-AS-AP - Sprint Networks

Unclassified APNIC

RPKI valid 100% 8 of 8 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 9 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

8 observed

Every prefix observed with AS150389 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
103.29.8.0/23RPKI validIRR54
103.29.8.0/24RPKI validIRR54
103.29.9.0/24RPKI validIRR54
103.170.208.0/23RPKI validIRR54
103.170.208.0/24RPKI validIRR54
103.170.209.0/24RPKI validIRR54
118.179.10.0/24RPKI validIRR54
118.179.11.0/24RPKI validIRR54

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

9 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS150389 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
103.29.8.0/23/23APNIC
103.29.8.0/24/24APNIC
103.29.9.0/24/24APNIC
103.170.208.0/23/23APNIC
103.170.208.0/24/24APNIC
103.170.209.0/24/24APNIC
118.179.10.0/24/24APNIC
118.179.11.0/24/24APNIC
2001:df1:74c0::/48/48APNIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

9 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS150389 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2001:df1:74c0::/48APNICMARZIA KHANMAINT-MARZIAKHAN-BD2023-06-13Not announced
103.29.8.0/23APNICMARZIA KHANMAINT-MARZIAKHAN-BD2023-06-13Announced
103.29.8.0/24APNICMARZIA KHANMAINT-MARZIAKHAN-BD2023-06-13Announced
103.29.9.0/24APNICMARZIA KHANMAINT-MARZIAKHAN-BD2023-06-13Announced
103.170.208.0/23APNICShohela Sultana MucktaMAINT-NETWORK1-BD2023-09-16Announced
103.170.208.0/24APNICSprint NetworksMAINT-NETWORK1-BD2025-03-04Announced
103.170.209.0/24APNICSprint NetworksMAINT-NETWORK1-BD2025-03-04Announced
118.179.10.0/24APNICSprint NetworksMAINT-BD-BDHUB2024-11-09Announced
118.179.11.0/24APNICSprint NetworksMAINT-BD-BDHUB2024-11-09Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS150389 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-BDHUBAPNICLists AS150389 as a direct member
AS-DHAKACOM-BD-ASAPNICLists AS150389 as a direct member
AS-FGLAPNICLists AS150389 as a direct member
AS-KDDCUSTOMER2RADBLists AS150389 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V4RIPELists AS150389 as a direct member
AS-SET-BSCCLAPNICLists AS150389 as a direct member
AS-TRANSROUTE-SPECRIPELists AS150389 as a direct member
AS149765:AS-CORONETIIG-BDAPNICLists AS150389 as a direct member
AS150748:AS-GMAXAPNICLists AS150389 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-11-03 13:02 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-11-03. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.