Autonomous system
AS14836 CITY-OF-TORONTO
Unclassified ARIN
Summary
City of Toronto
government infrastructure
A sixteen-bit block held since the early allocations, and the routing archive only started seeing it in 2022.
What it's used for
- A municipal government's network. 70,144 addresses across eight IPv4 prefixes, with two observed BGP neighbours and no IPv6 announced. Every block is attributed to Canada.
Notable
- The bulk is
137.15.0.0/16, netnameTORNET-01, registered toCity of Toronto. - The remaining netnames run
TORNET-02,TORNET-03andTORNET-04, all to the same registrant. TORNET-03covers four separate blocks in206.130, from a/21down to a/24.- The routing archive first saw this AS in 2022, later than almost anything else in this range.
- Eighteen addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name.
- The registry lookup for
198.96.187.0/24failed.
Interesting
137.15is an address block from the era when a sixteen-bit range was something an organisation simply asked for. The city held it for decades while somebody else carried its traffic, and only took its own AS number recently. The allocation and the announcement can be twenty years apart.- Four netnames, numbered in the order they were acquired, is the tidiest filing habit in this range. Whoever registered the second block copied the first and incremented.
- Two neighbours for a city that runs transit, water and emergency services says the network is a customer of two providers and nothing else. A municipality has no reason to peer.
- Nothing answers a reverse lookup anywhere in it.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-10, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 8 prefixes · 70.14K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| CA | Canada | 8 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- ARIN
- Handle
AS14836- Registry name
- CITY-OF-TORONTO
- Registrant
- City of Toronto
- Abuse contact
- isg@toronto.ca
- Registered
- 2000-02-14
- Last changed
- 2012-03-02
- Allocation
- assigned
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 9 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS14836
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 9 of 9 announcements
- Route objects
- 9 naming AS14836
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,775 prefixes, as published 2026-10-11. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere