asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS14754 TELECOMUNICACIONES DE GUATEMALA, SOCIEDAD ANONIMA

Unclassified LACNIC

IPv4 addresses 962K 547 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 147 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly GT
Exchanges 3 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 6 18 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Telecomunicaciones de Guatemala

Guatemala · AI-generated

isp telecom infrastructure

Blocks registered to three different national operators, announced from one country, answering under a fourth country's domain.

What it's used for

  • A national telecom operator's network. 961,792 addresses across 543 IPv4 prefixes plus 148 IPv6 prefixes, with 29 observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • Every announced block is attributed to Guatemala, 691 prefixes in all.
  • The routing archive first saw this AS in 2008, later than most networks of its size.
  • Netnames are the address ranges themselves, in the form 186.76.0.0 - 186.77.255.255.
  • The registrants differ block by block: TELEMATIX/ ENITEL, CTE S.A. de C.V., and the holder's own name.
  • Four of eighteen sampled addresses returned a name, all of the form 254-191-76-186.enitel.net.ni.
  • The registry lookup for 190.212.0.0/17 failed.

Interesting

  • Those reverse names end in .ni, a country code that is not Guatemala's, on addresses the routing table places in Guatemala. Reverse DNS follows whoever runs the nameservers rather than whoever announces the prefix, and the two parted company here without either being rewritten.
  • Read the label backwards and it is the address: 254-191-76-186 is 186.76.191.254 with its octets reversed. Enough providers write them this way that an address in a log can be unreadable until you work out which end it starts at.
  • Three registrant names under one announcement, each a separate national operator, is a group that consolidated its routing long before it consolidated its paperwork. The registry is now the only place the original companies are visible.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 3 exchanges in 3 countries, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
Costa Rica Neutral Internet Exchange PointSan Jose, Costa Rica200.107.83.155
PIT Guatemala - Punto de Intercambio de Tráfico Neutral de GuatemalaGuatemala, Guatemala45.68.48.122
IXP-HN Puntos de Intercambio de Tráfico – HondurasTegucigalpa, Honduras181.210.17.9

Transit providers

6 upstream, 18 downstream and 39 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS6453TATA COMMUNICATIONS (AMERICA) INC9,759
AS1299Arelion Sweden AB8,350
AS174Cogent Communications, LLC6,567
AS2914NTT America, Inc.3,736
AS701Verizon Business3,670
AS3356Level 3 Parent, LLC1,674

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 547 prefixes · 962K addresses IPv6 147 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
GTGuatemala694

Registry

Allocation record

LACNIC · via Atlas (registry data)
Registry
LACNIC
Registered
2000-02-03
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
95% valid · 606 valid, 32 with no ROA
ROAs
88 authorising AS14754
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 638 of 638 announcements
Route objects
759 naming AS14754

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check