asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS14645 AS-CJIS-20 - CJIS-Consortium-20th-Court Administration

Unclassified ARIN

IPv4 addresses 1.02K 1 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly US
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

CJIS Consortium, 20th Court Administration

United States · AI-generated

government infrastructure business

A shared criminal justice network for one judicial circuit, on a single upstream.

What it's used for

  • A court and law enforcement information consortium's network. 1,024 addresses in a single IPv4 prefix, with one observed BGP neighbour and no IPv6 announced.

Notable

  • The whole footprint is 204.147.204.0/22, carrying the netname NN-CJIS-20-JUD-FL.
  • That netname packs a registry-era prefix, the system, the circuit number, the word judicial and the state into one field.
  • An operations centre is named as the contact rather than an individual.
  • Three addresses were queried for reverse DNS and none returned a name.

Interesting

  • A consortium is an unusual holder for address space. Courts, the sheriff's office, the clerk and the state attorney each answer to different authorities, but they all need the same case and warrant records, so they share one network and one AS between them. The registry has no way to express that, so it records the shared body as though it were a company.
  • The two letters at the front of the netname are a convention from the era before regional registries, so this record has survived every change of address policy since without being refiled.
  • One upstream for a system carrying criminal justice records is the arrangement most worth questioning here, though a network that talks mainly to state systems may reach them by other paths the collector cannot see.
  • Publishing nothing in reverse DNS is correct for records this sensitive.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS14747Lee County Clerk of Courts58

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-06, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 1 prefixes · 1.02K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
USUnited States of America1

Registry

Allocation record

ARIN · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
ARIN
Handle
AS14645
Registry name
AS-CJIS-20
Registrant
CJIS-Consortium-20th-Court Administration
Abuse contact
schilds@ca.cjis20.org
Registered
2008-12-22
Last changed
2012-03-02
Allocation
assigned

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 1 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS14645
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
0% registered · 0 of 1 announcements 1 other origin
Route objects
0 naming AS14645

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 454 networks and 1,854 prefixes, as published 2026-11-06. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check