Routing security
AS141419 CMI-THA-AS-AP CHINA MOBILE INTERNATIONAL THAILAND LTD.
Mobile APNIC
Announcements
What this network originates
Every prefix observed with AS141419 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.
| Prefix | RPKI | IRR | Vantage points |
|---|---|---|---|
| 223.119.52.0/24 | RPKI valid | IRR | 57 |
RPKI · ROAs
Route origin authorisations
Signed statements by address holders that AS141419 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.
| Prefix | Max length | Trust anchor |
|---|---|---|
| 223.119.52.0/24 | /24 | APNIC |
ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.
RPKI · ASPA
Declared transit providers
This network has signed an ASPA record naming its transit providers. Each is compared against the upstreams observed in routing paths.
| AS | Network | ASPA | Routing paths |
|---|---|---|---|
| AS4651 | National Telecom Public Company Limited | Declared | Observed |
| AS45458 | SBN-ISP/AWN-ISP and SBN-NIX/AWN-NIX | Declared | not observed |
| AS45642 | Jasmine International Tower | Declared | not observed |
| AS58453 | China Mobile International Limited | Declared | Observed |
| AS58807 | China Mobile International Limited | Declared | not observed |
| AS24482 | SG.GS | not declared | Observed |
An observed upstream that is not declared is not necessarily a leak: our upstream inference cannot tell a transit provider from a peer seen in the same position. A declared provider that is never observed is usually a backup path.
IRR
Registered route objects
Route objects naming AS141419 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.
| Prefix | Source | Description | Maintainer | Changed | Routing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 223.119.52.0/24 | APNIC | CMI Thailand Customers | MAINT-CMI-INT-TH | 2024-03-12 | Announced |
| 223.119.52.0/24 | RADB | CMI Thailand Customer's Routes | MAINT-AS58453 | 2023-11-13 | Announced |
IRR
AS-sets
The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS141419 directly show who expects to carry it.
| AS-set | Where | Relationship |
|---|---|---|
AS141419:AS-THACUST | PeeringDB | Declared by the operator as its own set |
AS-63529-AS-IMPORT-AS45265 | APNIC | Lists AS141419 as a direct member |
AS-BKNIX-RS | APNIC | Lists AS141419 as a direct member |
AS-HURRICANE | RADB | Lists AS141419 as a direct member |
AS-KDDCUSTOMER2 | RADB | Lists AS141419 as a direct member |
AS-TELSTRA-INTL-CUSTOMERS | RADB | Lists AS141419 as a direct member |
AS-TH-IX-AS45458 | RADB | Lists AS141419 as a direct member |
AS-TH-IX-AS45642 | RADB | Lists AS141419 as a direct member |
AS-THIX | RADB | Lists AS141419 as a direct member |
AS-TRANSROUTE-SPEC | RIPE | Lists AS141419 as a direct member |
AS141419:AS-THACUST | RADB | Lists AS141419 as a direct member |
AS58453:AS-CMI | APNIC | Lists AS141419 as a direct member |
AS58453:AS-CMI | RADB | Lists AS141419 as a direct member |
AS63529:AS-63529-AS-IMPORT-AS45265 | APNIC | Lists AS141419 as a direct member |
RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-14 12:07 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-14. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.