asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS14112 NET-SECURENET-MTL

Unclassified ARIN

IPv4 addresses 4.10K 9 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly CA
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 2 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

SecureNet Information Services

Canada · AI-generated

isp telecom hosting

Five blocks carry the same registry code with one more letter of the company name in front each time.

What it's used for

  • A regional ISP's network in Canada. 4,096 addresses across nine IPv4 prefixes, with two observed BGP neighbours and no IPv6 announced.

Notable

  • Five netnames are the same code with a growing prefix of the company name, each adding one letter: 15-04313-210300-21-20160209-CA, SEC15-04313-210300-21-20160209-CA, SECU15-04313-210300-21-20160209-CA, SECUR15-04313-210300-21-20160209-CA and SECURE15-04313-210300-21-20160209-CA.
  • Two blocks belong to other companies: TUG-NET registered to Tugnet Enr, and VANTREE-COM registered to VanTree Systems Inc.
  • Six of eighteen sampled addresses answered, including mtl-pppoe-adsl763.securenet.net, tnt1-mtl-dialup123.securenet.net, dialup128.efsnet.ca, and three addresses all returning ns1432.ztomy.com.

Interesting

  • The growing prefix is a collision workaround. Netnames must be unique within the registry, the code was the same on every filing, and the fix each time was to add one more character of the company name until the string was free. Five filings, five letters, in order.
  • The reverse zone is a museum. It names dial-up concentrators by number and site, marks other addresses as broadband over telephone line, and does both in a city abbreviation that predates everything else here. Those names survive because deleting them is work and leaving them is not.
  • Three addresses answering with the same nameserver hostname belong to a domain-parking operation, which is what a block ends up doing when the customers who used it have gone.
  • Two acquired ISPs kept their own registry records, so the company's history is legible from its netnames alone.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

2 upstream, 0 downstream and 2 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS21949Beanfield Technologies Inc.471
AS577Bell Canada355

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-16, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 9 prefixes · 4.10K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
CACanada9

Registry

Allocation record

ARIN · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
ARIN
Handle
AS14112
Registry name
NET-SECURENET-MTL
Registrant
SecureNet Information Services
Abuse contact
jmvandette@securenet.net
Registered
1999-10-22
Last changed
2013-11-26
Allocation
assigned

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
64% valid · 9 valid, 5 with no ROA
ROAs
5 authorising AS14112
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 14 of 14 announcements
Route objects
23 naming AS14112

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,783 prefixes, as published 2026-10-17. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check