asn.dev

Routing security

AS134542 UNICOM-GUIAN China Unicom IP network

Unclassified APNIC

RPKI valid 100% 22 of 22 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 27% 5 missing · 11 other origin
ROAs 22 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

22 observed

Every prefix observed with AS134542 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
59.80.0.0/17RPKI validNo IRR51
59.80.0.0/19RPKI validNo IRR51
59.80.32.0/19RPKI validNo IRR51
59.80.64.0/19RPKI validNo IRR51
59.80.96.0/19RPKI validNo IRR51
103.161.220.0/23RPKI validIRR other origin12
116.63.128.0/18RPKI validIRR other origin12
122.9.128.0/19RPKI validIRR other origin12
122.9.160.0/20RPKI validIRR other origin12
139.9.144.0/20RPKI validIRR other origin12
139.9.224.0/20RPKI validIRR other origin11
139.9.240.0/21RPKI validIRR other origin11
139.9.248.0/22RPKI validIRR other origin11
140.210.192.0/19RPKI validIRR other origin10
140.210.224.0/20RPKI validIRR other origin10
2407:c080:1800::/37RPKI validIRR other origin12
43.254.100.0/24RPKI validIRR51
43.254.101.0/24RPKI validIRR51
43.254.102.0/24RPKI validIRR51
43.254.103.0/24RPKI validIRR51
2408:877f::/32RPKI validIRR28
2408:877f:31::/48RPKI validIRR covering28

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

22 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS134542 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

9 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS134542 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
43.254.100.0/24NTTCOMCMI IP TransitMAINT-CMI-INT-HK2016-05-25Announced
43.254.100.0/24RADBCMI (Customer Route)MAINT-AS584532023-11-13Announced
43.254.101.0/24NTTCOMCMI IP TransitMAINT-CMI-INT-HK2016-05-25Announced
43.254.101.0/24RADBCMI (Customer Route)MAINT-AS584532023-11-13Announced
43.254.102.0/24NTTCOMCMI IP TransitMAINT-CMI-INT-HK2016-05-25Announced
43.254.102.0/24RADBCMI (Customer Route)MAINT-AS584532023-11-13Announced
43.254.103.0/24NTTCOMCMI IP TransitMAINT-CMI-INT-HK2016-05-25Announced
43.254.103.0/24RADBCMI (Customer Route)MAINT-AS584532023-11-13Announced
2408:877f::/32APNICChina UnicomMAINT-CNCGROUP-RR2023-06-15Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS134542 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-RESEARCH-CN-CHINAUNICOMALTDBLists AS134542 as a direct member
AS4837:AS-CNCGROUPAPNICLists AS134542 as a direct member
AS4837:AS-CUGROUPAPNICLists AS134542 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-15 12:09 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-15. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.