asn.dev

Routing security

AS133551 ORIGINNET-AS-AP OriginNet

Unclassified APNIC

RPKI valid 100% 12 of 12 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 12 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

12 observed

Every prefix observed with AS133551 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
103.48.0.0/24RPKI validIRR51
103.48.1.0/24RPKI validIRR51
103.54.148.0/24RPKI validIRR51
103.54.149.0/24RPKI validIRR51
103.54.150.0/24RPKI validIRR51
103.54.151.0/24RPKI validIRR51
103.209.76.0/24RPKI validIRR51
103.209.79.0/24RPKI validIRR51
160.30.108.0/24RPKI validIRR53
165.99.254.0/24RPKI validIRR51
165.99.255.0/24RPKI validIRR51
2001:df1:a040::/48RPKI validIRR30

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

12 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS133551 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
103.48.0.0/24/24APNIC
103.48.1.0/24/24APNIC
103.54.148.0/24/24APNIC
103.54.149.0/24/24APNIC
103.54.150.0/24/24APNIC
103.54.151.0/24/24APNIC
103.209.76.0/24/24APNIC
103.209.79.0/24/24APNIC
160.30.108.0/24/24APNIC
165.99.254.0/24/24APNIC
165.99.255.0/24/24APNIC
2001:df1:a040::/48/48APNIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

13 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS133551 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
103.48.0.0/24APNICORIGIN NET (PRIVATE) LIMITEDMAINT-ORIGINNET-PK2024-12-02Announced
103.48.1.0/24APNICORIGIN NET (PRIVATE) LIMITEDMAINT-ORIGINNET-PK2024-07-05Announced
103.48.1.0/24RADBPTCL VIA EMIXMAINT-AS89662024-09-02Announced
103.54.148.0/24RADBautogenMAINT-AS8342026-09-29Announced
103.54.149.0/24RADBautogenMAINT-AS8342026-09-29Announced
103.54.150.0/24RADBautogenMAINT-AS8342026-09-29Announced
103.54.151.0/24RADBautogenMAINT-AS8342026-09-29Announced
103.209.76.0/24APNICKill PingMAINT-KILLINGPING-PK2026-08-27Announced
103.209.79.0/24APNICKill PingMAINT-KILLINGPING-PK2026-08-27Announced
160.30.108.0/24APNICLAHORE DIGITAL NETWORK (PVT.) LIMITEDMAINT-LDNPL-PK2024-10-10Announced
165.99.254.0/24APNICGigabit Networks (Pvt.) Ltd.MAINT-GNL-PK2025-09-26Announced
165.99.255.0/24APNICGigabit Networks (Pvt.) Ltd.MAINT-GNL-PK2025-07-20Announced
2001:df1:a040::/48APNICORIGIN NET (PRIVATE) LIMITEDMAINT-ORIGINNET-PK2025-06-30Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS133551 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-AZURETECHRADBLists AS133551 as a direct member
AS-CTI-TELECOMRADBLists AS133551 as a direct member
AS-EMIXRADBLists AS133551 as a direct member
AS-HKBN-TRANSITRADBLists AS133551 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS133551 as a direct member
AS-KDDCUSTOMER2RADBLists AS133551 as a direct member
AS-OTW-CUSTAPNICLists AS133551 as a direct member
AS-SETPTCLAPNICLists AS133551 as a direct member
AS-TELSTRA-INTL-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS133551 as a direct member
AS38193:AS-PEERSAPNICLists AS133551 as a direct member
AS53587:AS-CONERADBLists AS133551 as a direct member
AS58453:AS-ASIAASCUSTAPNICLists AS133551 as a direct member
AS58453:AS-ASIAASCUSTRADBLists AS133551 as a direct member
AS9269:AS-HKBN-TRANSITNTTCOMLists AS133551 as a direct member
AS9269:AS-HKBN-TRANSITRADBLists AS133551 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-15 12:09 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-15. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.