Autonomous system
AS13174 MTSNET Moscow, Russia
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
MTSNet
telecom mobile isp
The reverse names put the last octet first, and a hand-set nameserver sits in the middle of them.
What it's used for
- A network of a large mobile and fixed-line operator in the Russian Federation. 11,520 addresses across ten IPv4 prefixes, one observed BGP neighbour, and no IPv6 announced.
Notable
213.87.20.0answers0.20.mts.ruand213.87.3.255answers255.3.mts.ru: the final octet becomes the first label.- One block uses hyphens instead, as
infrastructure-0-45.mtsnet.ru, and another prefixesh-. 213.87.50.254answersns2.mts.ru, a name nothing generated.- Netnames are
MTSNET,MTSNET2,MTS-IT,RU-MTU-20081003andMTSRETAIL-RU, the last registered toJSC "Russian Telephone Company"alongsideAO "RTK" NOC abuse.
Interesting
- Reversing the octets matches the order of the reverse-DNS tree itself, where addresses are looked up backwards. It reads wrong to a person and right to the resolver, and only two octets appear at all, so the name is ambiguous outside its own zone.
- Four naming schemes across ten blocks, plus one address with a real hostname, is a zone assembled by different teams at different times with nothing enforcing consistency.
- One block's registrant names the same company twice, spelled out with an English legal-form abbreviation and again as an initialism with the transliterated one, on a netname pointing at a retail arm rather than the network operator.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS8359 | MTS PJSC | 687 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-26, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 10 prefixes · 11.52K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| RU | Russian Federation | 10 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS13174- Registry name
- MTSNet
- Registrant
- MTSNET-MNT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@mtu.ru
- Registered
- 2002-08-26
- Last changed
- 2024-12-09
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 75% valid · 9 valid, 3 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 12 authorising AS13174
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 12 of 12 announcements
- Route objects
- 21 naming AS13174
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 446 networks and 1,852 prefixes, as published 2026-10-27. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere