asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS13171 BSU

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 256 1 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly BY
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Belarusian State University

Belarus · AI-generated

education research

An entire university's outbound traffic behind one address, and its name says so.

What it's used for

  • The network of a university in Belarus. 256 addresses in one IPv4 prefix, one observed BGP neighbour, and no IPv6 announced.

Notable

  • The single prefix is 217.21.43.0/24, netname BELSTATEUNIVERSITY.
  • The AS handle is BSU, three letters with nothing else.
  • One of three sampled addresses returned a name: nat.bsu.by.
  • One observed BGP neighbour.

Interesting

  • A host called nat is the translation point every internal machine leaves through. It means the university's real network is private space of whatever size it likes, and the /24 exists to give that traffic a public face plus room for the servers that must be reachable from outside.
  • That arrangement is why address counts understate institutions badly. Two hundred and fifty-six addresses could be a small office; here it fronts a whole campus, and only the hostname reveals it.
  • The netname spells the institution out in full with no separators and no date, an older style than the country-prefixed dated form that dominates this range.
  • One upstream for a national university is a single point of failure, and also the normal shape when research and education traffic all leaves through one academic network.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS25106Mobile TeleSystems JLLC61

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-19, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 1 prefixes · 256 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
BYBelarus1

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS13171
Registry name
BSU
Registrant
AS13171-MNT
Abuse contact
cyberdepartment@bsu.by
Registered
2002-09-04
Last changed
2026-09-21
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 1 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
1 authorising AS13171
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 1 of 1 announcements
Route objects
1 naming AS13171

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,783 prefixes, as published 2026-10-20. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check