asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS13155 MTS-IRK-AS

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 4.86K 8 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly RU
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

MTS

Russian Federation · AI-generated

telecom mobile isp

Two company initialisms, MTS and MTU, share every record on this network.

What it's used for

  • A regional network of a large mobile and fixed-line operator in the Russian Federation. 4,864 addresses across eight IPv4 prefixes, one observed BGP neighbour, and no IPv6 announced.

Notable

  • Netnames run RU-MTU-20000816, RU-MTU-20070704, RU-MTU-20171019, plus RU-SIBRON-BLOCK and MTU-ADSL.
  • Every block lists MTS backbone NOC and an abuse contact recorded as MTU Abuse-c Bender.
  • One observed BGP neighbour against eight prefixes.
  • Eighteen addresses were sampled and none returned a name.

Interesting

  • The holder is MTS and the address records say MTU. That is an acquired operator whose registrations were never renamed, and the dates show how long the overlap has lasted: blocks issued under the old initialism in 2000, 2007 and again in 2017, well after the network became someone else's.
  • MTU-ADSL labels a block by access technology. ADSL is the customer-facing product of a particular era, so the netname dates itself more precisely than the digits on its siblings do.
  • SIBRON is a third name again, and the abuse contact carries a personal handle rather than a role. Between them these fields hold four ways of referring to one operator, which is what makes registry-based attribution unreliable without cross-checking.
  • One neighbour for eight scattered prefixes means this AS sits behind a single upstream: it is a regional arm, not the operator's backbone.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS8359MTS PJSC928

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-19, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 8 prefixes · 4.86K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
RURussian Federation8

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS13155
Registry name
MTS-IRK-AS
Registrant
MTU-NOC
Abuse contact
abuse@mtu.ru
Registered
1970-01-01
Last changed
2021-11-15
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
6% valid · 1 valid, 15 with no ROA
ROAs
1 authorising AS13155
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
94% registered · 15 of 16 announcements 1 other origin
Route objects
15 naming AS13155

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,778 prefixes, as published 2026-10-20. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check