asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS12991 LAND-OOE Rechenzentrum

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 10.24K 3 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 1 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly AT
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 2 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Land Oberösterreich

Austria · AI-generated

government infrastructure enterprise

A regional government's data centre, with one gateway visible and nothing else.

What it's used for

  • The network of an Austrian state government administration. 10,240 addresses across three IPv4 prefixes, one IPv6 prefix, and three observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • All three IPv4 blocks share the netname ATOOEN01.
  • The AS handle is LAND-OOE Rechenzentrum, naming the data centre rather than the government.
  • The IPv6 prefix is a /48 from a range the regional registry assigns directly.
  • One of nine sampled addresses returned a name: gateway.ooe.gv.at.

Interesting

  • ATOOEN01 is a country code, a state abbreviation, a letter and a sequence number, which is a naming scheme built to be extended rather than read. The 01 implies an 02 that the three blocks sharing this one name never needed.
  • The single visible hostname is gateway, on a government domain. A regional administration runs schools, hospitals and offices behind that address space, and the public internet sees one labelled door. That is the correct amount to expose and it is rarer than it should be.
  • The handle names the data centre because, for a government, the network belongs to a facility rather than to a department. Whoever registered it was describing the operational owner, which is more accurate than the political entity would have been.
  • Three blocks, one netname, and space in 194.48 allocated in the mid-1990s. Public administrations connected early, kept what they were given, and have had little reason to expand since; a /19 has covered a state's entire administration for thirty years.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

2 upstream, 0 downstream and 4 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS1853ACONET143
AS21013eww ag98

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-16, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 3 prefixes · 10.24K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
ATAustria4

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS12991
Registry name
Land-OOE
Registrant
AS12991-MNT
Abuse contact
st2.it.post@ooe.gv.at
Registered
2002-06-10
Last changed
2018-09-04
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 4 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS12991
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 4 of 4 announcements
Route objects
5 naming AS12991

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,783 prefixes, as published 2026-10-17. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check