Autonomous system
AS12991 LAND-OOE Rechenzentrum
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
Land Oberösterreich
government infrastructure enterprise
A regional government's data centre, with one gateway visible and nothing else.
What it's used for
- The network of an Austrian state government administration. 10,240 addresses across three IPv4 prefixes, one IPv6 prefix, and three observed BGP neighbours.
Notable
- All three IPv4 blocks share the netname
ATOOEN01. - The AS handle is
LAND-OOE Rechenzentrum, naming the data centre rather than the government. - The IPv6 prefix is a
/48from a range the regional registry assigns directly. - One of nine sampled addresses returned a name:
gateway.ooe.gv.at.
Interesting
ATOOEN01is a country code, a state abbreviation, a letter and a sequence number, which is a naming scheme built to be extended rather than read. The01implies an02that the three blocks sharing this one name never needed.- The single visible hostname is
gateway, on a government domain. A regional administration runs schools, hospitals and offices behind that address space, and the public internet sees one labelled door. That is the correct amount to expose and it is rarer than it should be. - The handle names the data centre because, for a government, the network belongs to a facility rather than to a department. Whoever registered it was describing the operational owner, which is more accurate than the political entity would have been.
- Three blocks, one netname, and space in
194.48allocated in the mid-1990s. Public administrations connected early, kept what they were given, and have had little reason to expand since; a /19 has covered a state's entire administration for thirty years.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-16, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 3 prefixes · 10.24K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| AT | Austria | 4 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS12991- Registry name
- Land-OOE
- Registrant
- AS12991-MNT
- Abuse contact
- st2.it.post@ooe.gv.at
- Registered
- 2002-06-10
- Last changed
- 2018-09-04
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 4 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS12991
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 4 of 4 announcements
- Route objects
- 5 naming AS12991
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,783 prefixes, as published 2026-10-17. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere