asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS12976 AS-CWSVYAZ

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 15.62K 5 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 1 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly RU
Exchanges 1 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 4 1 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

CITIC Telecom CPC Rus

Russia · AI-generated

telecom business hosting

A block registered in 2003 and later cut into four descending pieces, all keeping the same date.

What it's used for

  • The Russian arm of an international corporate network services provider. 15,616 addresses across five IPv4 prefixes, one IPv6 prefix, and 13 observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • Four blocks sit inside 212.65: a /20, a /21, a /22 and a /24, each roughly half the last.
  • All four carry the netname RU-CITICTELECOM-20030828.
  • A separate 213.152.128.0/19 carries RU-CITICTELECOM-20000124.
  • The registry lookup for 212.65.84.0/24 failed, so nothing here describes that block's record.
  • Fifteen addresses were sampled and none returned a name.

Interesting

  • The halving ladder is the third seen in this range. One allocation was split into progressively smaller announcements, and because the netname was inherited by each piece, the registry still describes them as one thing while the routing table sees four. Reading prefix counts as a measure of anything requires knowing which of the two you are counting.
  • The company is a Chinese-owned operator running a Russian subsidiary, and both its blocks predate that ownership. Corporate network providers are bought and sold as going concerns, address space included, and the netnames were rewritten to the current owner while the dates were kept.
  • Thirteen neighbours for a corporate network services provider is the shape of the business: the customers are companies reached over private connections, and the public peering exists to carry their internet traffic rather than to attract anyone.
  • Nothing answers reverse lookups, consistent with space used for managed corporate connections.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
MSK-IX MoscowMoscow, Russia195.208.208.209

Transit providers

4 upstream, 1 downstream and 8 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS3327CITIC Telecom CPC Netherlands B.V.116
AS6939Hurricane Electric LLC30
AS24482SG.GS3
AS49673Truenetwork LLC2

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-20, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 5 prefixes · 15.62K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
RURussian Federation6

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS12976
Registry name
AS-CWSVYAZ
Registrant
AS3327-MNT
Abuse contact
abuse@citictel-cpc.com
Registered
2002-09-24
Last changed
2023-11-29
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 3 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
3 authorising AS12976
ASPA
1 declared providers
IRR
100% registered · 3 of 3 announcements
Route objects
3 naming AS12976

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,778 prefixes, as published 2026-10-20. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check