Autonomous system
AS12976 AS-CWSVYAZ
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
CITIC Telecom CPC Rus
telecom business hosting
A block registered in 2003 and later cut into four descending pieces, all keeping the same date.
What it's used for
- The Russian arm of an international corporate network services provider. 15,616 addresses across five IPv4 prefixes, one IPv6 prefix, and 13 observed BGP neighbours.
Notable
- Four blocks sit inside
212.65: a /20, a /21, a /22 and a /24, each roughly half the last. - All four carry the netname
RU-CITICTELECOM-20030828. - A separate
213.152.128.0/19carriesRU-CITICTELECOM-20000124. - The registry lookup for
212.65.84.0/24failed, so nothing here describes that block's record. - Fifteen addresses were sampled and none returned a name.
Interesting
- The halving ladder is the third seen in this range. One allocation was split into progressively smaller announcements, and because the netname was inherited by each piece, the registry still describes them as one thing while the routing table sees four. Reading prefix counts as a measure of anything requires knowing which of the two you are counting.
- The company is a Chinese-owned operator running a Russian subsidiary, and both its blocks predate that ownership. Corporate network providers are bought and sold as going concerns, address space included, and the netnames were rewritten to the current owner while the dates were kept.
- Thirteen neighbours for a corporate network services provider is the shape of the business: the customers are companies reached over private connections, and the public peering exists to carry their internet traffic rather than to attract anyone.
- Nothing answers reverse lookups, consistent with space used for managed corporate connections.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| MSK-IX Moscow | Moscow, Russia | 195.208.208.209 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-20, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 5 prefixes · 15.62K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| RU | Russian Federation | 6 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS12976- Registry name
- AS-CWSVYAZ
- Registrant
- AS3327-MNT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@citictel-cpc.com
- Registered
- 2002-09-24
- Last changed
- 2023-11-29
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 3 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 3 authorising AS12976
- ASPA
- 1 declared providers
- IRR
- 100% registered · 3 of 3 announcements
- Route objects
- 3 naming AS12976
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,778 prefixes, as published 2026-10-20. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere