asn.dev

Routing security

AS12905 ACS-SK-AS

Unclassified RIPE Cable/DSL/ISP

RPKI valid 100% 6 of 6 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 6 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

6 observed

Every prefix observed with AS12905 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a06:6bc0::/29RPKI validIRR34
46.29.1.0/24RPKI validIRR53
62.176.160.0/19RPKI validIRR53
185.250.244.0/22RPKI validIRR53
193.200.9.0/24RPKI validIRR53
195.146.13.0/24RPKI validIRR53

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

6 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS12905 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
46.29.1.0/24/24RIPENCC
62.176.160.0/19/19RIPENCC
185.250.244.0/22/22RIPENCC
193.200.9.0/24/24RIPENCC
195.146.13.0/24/24RIPENCC
2a06:6bc0::/29/29RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

3 declared

This network has signed an ASPA record naming its transit providers. Each is compared against the upstreams observed in routing paths.

ASNetworkASPARouting paths
AS3257GTT Communications Inc.DeclaredObserved
AS31117ENERGOTEL a.s.DeclaredObserved
AS39392SH.cz s.r.o.Declarednot observed
AS6939Hurricane Electric LLCnot declaredObserved
AS3303Swisscom (Schweiz) AGnot declaredObserved
AS31230Slovak University of Technology in Bratislavanot declaredObserved
AS24482SG.GSnot declaredObserved

An observed upstream that is not declared is not necessarily a leak: our upstream inference cannot tell a transit provider from a peer seen in the same position. A declared provider that is never observed is usually a backup path.

IRR

Registered route objects

8 objects · 2 not announced

Route objects naming AS12905 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
195.168.47.0/24RIPEGTS Slovakia BGP customerGTSSK-MNT2012-02-20Not announced
2a06:6bc0::/48RIPEACS SK ISPACS-SK-MNT2015-08-24Not announced
46.29.1.0/24RIPEPetranetACS-SK-MNT2015-05-28Announced
62.176.160.0/19RIPEACS SlovakiaACS-SK-MNT2004-02-09Announced
185.250.244.0/22RIPE—ACS-SK-MNT2019-06-21Announced
193.200.9.0/24RIPEAxonPro sroACS-SK-MNT2010-05-28Announced
195.146.13.0/24RIPE—AS6663-MNT2023-04-03Announced
2a06:6bc0::/29RIPEACS s.r.o - ISPACS-SK-MNT2015-10-09Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS12905 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-ACSSKPeeringDBDeclared by the operator as its own set
AS-ACSSKRIPELists AS12905 as a direct member
AS-ENERGOTELRIPELists AS12905 as a direct member
AS-ENERGOTEL_SIX_PEERSRIPELists AS12905 as a direct member
AS-EWSK-SIXRIPELists AS12905 as a direct member
AS-GTTCUSTRIPELists AS12905 as a direct member
AS-GTTCUST6RIPELists AS12905 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS12905 as a direct member
AS-PANTEL-INTRIPELists AS12905 as a direct member
AS-PRIMANETSIXPEERSRIPELists AS12905 as a direct member
AS-SIXSK-MEMBERSRIPELists AS12905 as a direct member
AS-SIXSTIP-SETRIPELists AS12905 as a direct member
AS42000:AS-SIXSK-PEERINGSRIPELists AS12905 as a direct member
AS59510:AS-GIBIRIXRIPELists AS12905 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-22 12:01 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-22. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.