asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS12883 UCOMLINE PRIVATE JOINT-STOCK COMPANY FARLEP-INVEST

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 18.94K 30 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 1 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly UA
Exchanges 3 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 6 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Ucomline (Farlep-Invest)

Ukraine · AI-generated

isp telecom business

One company written four different ways in a single registry record, and city codes hidden in the reverse names.

What it's used for

  • A Ukrainian internet provider. 17,408 addresses across 28 IPv4 prefixes, one IPv6 prefix, and eight observed BGP neighbours.

Notable

  • The largest blocks are 62.221.40.0/21 and 93.178.216.0/21.
  • Netnames are UA-OD-20030520, UA-OD-20080403 and VEGA-GPON-LVIV.
  • One record lists the holder as Farlep Invest PrJSC, PRIVATE JOINT-STOCK COMPANY "FARLEP-INVEST", Farlep-Invest PJSC and a Vega Telecom Group operations team, all at once.
  • The registry lookup for 93.178.204.0/22 failed, so nothing here describes that block's record.
  • Ten of eighteen sampled addresses returned names, including 0-42.221.62.khe.vega-ua.net, 62-221-45-254.static.vega-ua.net and the bare domain ucomline.net.

Interesting

  • The same company appears four times in four spellings: with and without quotes, expanded and abbreviated, hyphenated and not. Each is a separate contact object created at a different time by a different person, and the registry has no notion that they are the same entity.
  • The names encode geography twice over. UA-OD marks Odesa, VEGA-GPON-LVIV marks Lviv and the fibre technology serving it, and khe inside a reverse name marks Kherson. Read together the records sketch a national network city by city, which no single field was meant to convey.
  • One address answers with a bare domain, ucomline.net, rather than a hostname within it. A reverse name pointing at a domain's apex is what happens when someone fills the field with the company's website instead of a name for the machine.
  • Two reverse-name styles run side by side: one reverses the octets and appends a city, the other writes them forwards and says static. Different parts of this network were configured by different people at different times, and nothing ever forced them into agreement.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

Recorded at 3 exchanges in 3 countries, largest first.

ExchangeLocationTheir address
DE-CIX FrankfurtFrankfurt, Germany2001:7f8::3253:0:1
AMS-IX AmsterdamAmsterdam, Netherlands80.249.211.215
GNM Internet Exchange UkraineKiev, Ukraine178.18.230.47

Transit providers

1 upstream, 6 downstream and 8 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS21497PrJSC "VF UKRAINE"387

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 30 prefixes · 18.94K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
UAUkraine31

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS12883
Registry name
UCOMLINE
Registrant
PRIVATE JOINT-STOCK COMPANY "FARLEP-INVEST"
Abuse contact
abuse@vegatele.com
Registered
2002-08-14
Last changed
2021-02-25
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 7 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS12883
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 7 of 7 announcements
Route objects
45 naming AS12883

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 436 networks and 1,771 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check