Autonomous system
AS12861 DEKSAR Vestel Elektronik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S.
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
Vestel (Deksar)
enterprise business infrastructure
An electronics manufacturer's network, announced under a subsidiary's name.
What it's used for
- Corporate networking for a Turkish consumer-electronics manufacturer. 2,048 addresses across six IPv4 prefixes, three observed BGP neighbours, and no IPv6 announced.
Notable
- Five blocks sit in
212.29:212.29.66.0/23,212.29.64.0/24,212.29.69.0/24,212.29.70.0/24and212.29.90.0/24, all netnameVESTELNET. 91.237.216.0/23isTR-DEKSAR-20120330.- The AS handle is
DEKSAR; the registered holder is the manufacturer. - The abuse contact is named
Abuse Contact Point for tr.deksar. - Eighteen addresses were sampled and none returned a name.
Interesting
- The AS is named for the telecoms subsidiary and the addresses are named for the parent. Large manufacturers spin off their internal IT and networking into separate companies, which then sell the same service to outside customers; the registry captures the moment mid-split, with one name on the AS and another on the blocks.
- Five separate announcements from inside a single
/22-sized neighbourhood, where one or two routes would carry the same addresses. Deaggregation like this usually means the pieces are handled by different sites or different equipment, and the routing table pays for the distinction. tr.deksarin the contact name is written like a domain in reverse order, country first. That is Java package convention rather than anything from networking, and it is a small sign of which department filled the form in.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-03, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 6 prefixes · 2.05K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| TR | Turkey | 6 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS12861- Registry name
- DEKSAR
- Registrant
- DEXNET-MNT
- Abuse contact
- halil.aydin@zorlu.com
- Registered
- 1970-01-01
- Last changed
- 2018-09-04
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 8 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 8 authorising AS12861
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 8 of 8 announcements
- Route objects
- 14 naming AS12861
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 451 networks and 1,853 prefixes, as published 2026-11-04. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere