asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS12812 ASN-AUBNET # AS-AUBNET CONVERTED TO ASN-AUBNET FOR RPSL COMPLIANCE Beirut, Lebanon

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 1.54K 2 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly LB
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 2 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

American University of Beirut

Lebanon · AI-generated

education research

The AS name contains a changelog entry explaining why the AS name was changed.

What it's used for

  • Campus networking for a Lebanese university. 1,536 addresses in two IPv4 prefixes, one observed BGP neighbour, and no IPv6 announced.

Notable

  • The AS handle reads, in full: ASN-AUBNET # AS-AUBNET CONVERTED TO ASN-AUBNET FOR RPSL COMPLIANCE Beirut, Lebanon.
  • The inventory is 193.188.128.0/22, netname AUBNET, and 185.190.28.0/23, netname LB-AUB-20170215.
  • First observed in the routing archive in August 2011.
  • Six addresses were sampled and none returned a name.

Interesting

  • That handle is a commit message that escaped into production. RPSL is the language routing policies are written in, and it reserved names beginning AS- for sets of autonomous systems — so an object called AS-AUBNET had to be renamed. Somebody documented the rename inside the name field itself, complete with a # comment marker, and every whois lookup has returned the explanation ever since.
  • The two blocks are three decades apart in registry practice: one undated netname from the era when a university simply had addresses, one stamped 20170215 from the era when every assignment is recorded to the day.
  • One neighbour for a university in a country with limited international capacity is a structural fact rather than a choice. Where transit is scarce and expensive, campuses connect through whichever national provider reaches them, and the routing shows it.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

2 upstream, 0 downstream and 2 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS24634Transmog Inc S.A.L240
AS39010TerraNet sal116

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-10, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 2 prefixes · 1.54K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
LBLebanon2

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS12812
Registry name
ASN-AUBNET
Registrant
AUBNET-MNT
Abuse contact
ripe-admin@aub.edu.lb
Registered
1970-01-01
Last changed
2018-02-27
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 6 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
9 authorising AS12812
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 6 of 6 announcements
Route objects
11 naming AS12812

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,775 prefixes, as published 2026-10-11. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check