Autonomous system
AS12794 AKNET-AKBANK
Unclassified ARIN
Summary
Akbank
finance enterprise business
Five prefixes inside one /22-sized neighbourhood, all of them a bank's own.
What it's used for
- Corporate networking for a Turkish bank. 2,304 addresses across five IPv4 prefixes, two observed BGP neighbours, and no IPv6 announced.
Notable
- Every block sits in
217.169: a/22, a/23and three/24s. - Three carry the dated netname
TR-AKBANK-20010327; two are the undatedTR-AKBANK. - The registry contact on all five is
Akbank IT. - The AS handle is
AKNET-AKBANK. - Fifteen addresses were sampled and none returned a name.
Interesting
- Five separate announcements from one contiguous neighbourhood is deaggregation by a network that could announce far less. Splitting adjacent space into pieces is how an operator steers traffic — different pieces to different upstreams, or a piece kept routable when the rest is withdrawn — and for a bank with two providers it is most likely about controlling which one carries what.
- The dated and undated netnames mark two filing eras under one holder.
20010327is precise to the day;TR-AKBANKis what the same organisation's records looked like before the registry started stamping them. - Two upstreams and 2,304 addresses is a bank's public edge: branches, cash machines and customer-facing services need to be reachable from anywhere and to survive losing a provider. Everything genuinely sensitive sits behind that on addresses the internet never sees.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-28, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 5 prefixes · 2.30K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| TR | Turkey | 5 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- ARIN
- Handle
AS12794- Registry name
- AKNET-AKBANK
- Registrant
- AKBANK-MNT
- Abuse contact
- lir@akbank.com
- Registered
- 1970-01-01
- Last changed
- 2017-11-15
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 17 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 18 authorising AS12794
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 17 of 17 announcements
- Route objects
- 19 naming AS12794
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 448 networks and 1,851 prefixes, as published 2026-10-29. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere